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CONSISTENTLY WRONG: THE SINGLE PRODUCT ISSUE
AND THE TYING CLAIMS AGAINST MICROSOFT
NORMAN W. HAWKER
A blatant hard-core tie would occur if Microsoft told customers, "You
cannot buy Windows 95 unless you also buy Internet Explorer."'
Microsoft has clearly met the burden of ascribing facially plausible bene-
fits to [bundling Windows 95 and Internet Explorer] as compared to an
operating system with a stand-alone browser.
I am at a loss to understand how a consent decree that is clearly intended
to limit Microsoft's conduct could be read to impose so little scrutiny of
that conduct
For the better part of this decade, the federal government has investi-
gated allegations that Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) has violated the
antitrust laws. After the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) deadlocked on
whether to file charges against Microsoft, the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) began its own investigation. Shortly thereafter,
the DOJ fied a consent decree against Microsoft focusing on Microsoft's
requirement that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) pay Microsoft a
royalty for every personal computer (PC) they sold regardless of whether the
PC had Microsoft operating system software (OS) installed and, to a lesser
extent, the nondisclosure agreements Microsoft entered into with independ-
" Assistant Professor of Law, Western Michigan University, Haworth College of Busi-
ness, Finance and Commercial Law Department. B.B.A., 1981; J.D., 1985, University of
Michigan. I would like to thank the Dean of the Haworth College of Business for a mini-
grant to support this research and the Resource Sharing Center staff at Waldo Library for
their invaluable assistance.
1. Samuel R. Miller, Does Netscape Really Have Antitrust Claims Against Microsoft?,
COMPtrrERLAw, Nov. 1996, at 7.
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
3. Id. at 959 n.5 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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ent software vendors (ISVs).4 A relatively obscure provision of the consent
decree prohibited Microsoft from requiring its customers to license "any
other product" as a condition for licensing Microsoft's OS with the proviso
that this restriction "in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit Micro-
soft from developing integrated products."5
Although the consent decree was widely criticized as too weak,6 two
years later, the DOJ seemed to prove the critics wrong when the District
Court entered a preliminary injunction against Microsoft after finding that
the software behemoth had violated an obscure provision of the consent de-
cree by requiring OEMs to install Microsoft's internet web browser, Internet
Explorer (IE), as a condition for licensing Microsoft's then current OS,
Windows 95.' In a stunning set back, however, a split decision of the Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that Internet Explorer and
the OS were "integrated products" protected by a proviso in the consent de-
cree's general prohibition against bundling the OS with other products.8 In
4. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See
also Abraham Perlstein, Microsoft andIts Anititrust Violations, 11 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 85,
100-03 (1996) (describing the consent decree as focused on Microsoft's non-disclosure
agreements with ISVs and per processor licensing agreements with OEMs).
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,096 (D.D.C. Aug.
21,1995).
6. The District Court initially refused to enter the consent decree partly because it
found that the decree would not "pry open" markets illegally closed by Microsoft's con-
duct. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 333 (D.D.C. 1995), rev'd, 56 F.3d
1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also Kenneth C. Baseman et al., Microsoft Plays Hardball: The
Use of Exclusionary Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in
Markets for Operating System Software, 40 ANTITRUST BuLL. 265, 299 (1995) ("the reme-
dies prescribed in the consent decree are likely to be inadequate"); John Markoff, Micro-
soft's Future Barely Limited, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1994, at Dl. Although the consent de-
cree focused on ending Microsoft's restrictive OS licensing practices, the damage from
these practices had already been done. See Jane Morrissey, DOJ Accord Fosters "Too Lit-
tle, Too Late" Perception, PC WEEK, July 25, 1994, at 29. Two years earlier, for example,
Apple Computer abandoned efforts to make a version of its Macintosh OS that would run
on IBM compatible PCs partly because Microsoft OS licensing practices effectively pre-
vented OEMs from using competing OS software. See Jodi Mardesich, The Secret Weapon
Apple Threw Away: Deep-cover Project Ran Mac OS on Intel Processors, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEvs (Nov. 1, 1997) <http://www.sjmercury.com/business/apple/startrek
110197.html>.
7. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997).
8. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 952. One of the things that made the reversal so stunning was
the widespread perception that Microsoft's claim that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer
constituted a single integrated product was "so transparently untrue that you have to won-
der what the company is up to." James Gleick, Justice Delayed, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1997,
§ 6, at 40. See also Robert X. Cringely, Sure, Microsoft Is Guilty (There, I Said It!), But
That's Not the Problem: The Software Industry is Sick, PBS ONLINE (Oct. 30, 1997)
<http://www.pbs.org/cringely/archive/oct2397_text.html> ('The fact that they [Microsoft]
are guilty is clear, at least to me."); Walt Mossberg, The Meaning Behind Jargon in Micro-
soft's Antitrust Battle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997, at B1 ("[I]n practical terms, I don't think
Internet Explorer is an integrated feature of Windows 95.").
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the final analysis, suggested the Court of Appeals,9 Microsoft had "clearly
met the burden of ascribing facially plausible benefits" to the combination
of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer."
Described as "a major victory for Microsoft" in the press," a consensus
immediately formed that not only had the Court of Appeals dealt the DOJ a
setback in its effort to enforce the consent decree, but that it had also estab-
lished an important precedent for the antitrust law of tying generally'2 and
for the separate lawsuit filed by the DOJ alleging that Microsoft had tied
Internet Explorer to its new OS, Windows 98." Microsoft wasted no time in
gloating over its victory, and joined in the general chorus that the Court of
Appeals had also gutted the DOJ's Windows 98 tying claims.'4 The Court of
Appeals itself added to this perception by emphasizing that its integrated
product test under the consent decree was "consistent with tying law"' 5 and
grounded, "as are the related antitrust doctrines, in a realistic assessment of
the institutional limits of the judiciary." 6 Judge Wald's dissent sharply,
however, argued that the Court of Appeals' test for integration conflicted
with the antitrust law test for separate products, and she proposed her own
test that would balance the synergies from tying against consumer percep-
9. Unless otherwise specified, this article will refer to the majority opinion in Micro-
soft, 147 F.3d 935, as the "Court of Appeals."
10. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950.
11. Edward G. Biester, III, What Lessons Result from the Appeals Court in Microsoft
Case?, LEGALINTELLIGENCER, July 2, 1998, at 7.
12. See Kelly Flaherty, DOJ's Microsoft Strategy Gutted, THE RECORDER, June 24,
1998, at 1 ('The court has held that product design and integration is effectively exempt
from tie-in claims.") (quoting Daniel Wall); Appeals Court Calls Injunction Improper in
Microsoft Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 1998, at 4 ('The decision will make it
harder for the Justice Department and 20 states to win broader lawsuits filed in May against
the world's largest software maker, antitrust experts said.").
13. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Microsoft Scores a Court Victory in Fight with Justice,
WASH. PosT, June 24, 1998, at C09 ("[L]egal experts said the ruling would force Justice to
rework the strategy in its broader antitrust case against Microsoft's next version, Windows
98, which bundles the operating system more tightly with the browser.").
14. See Elinor Mills, Microsoft Says Win95 Appeals Ruling Sets Precedent,
INFoWORLD ELECRIC, (June 23, 1998) <http://www.infoworld.com/cgifibin/displayStory.
pl?980623.wcprecedent.htm> ("Microsoft executives gloated during conference calls with
analysts and reporters, insinuating that the core argument of the U.S. Justice Department's
case against it involving Windows 98 is gutted"). See also Bob Trott, Gates: Ruling on
Windows 95 Applies to Windows 98 Case, INFoWORLD ELECrRIc, (June 26, 1998)
<http://www.infoworld.com/cgifibin/displayStory.pl?980626.ehgatesdoj.htm>; Naftali Ben-
david, A Big Win for Microsoft, CH. TRIB., (June 23, 1998) <http://chicagotribune.
com/versionl/article/0,1575,ART-10926,00.html> ("Microsoft officials reacted with pre-
dictable jubilation. William Neukom, Microsoft's vice president and general counsel, as-
serted that the decision is a bad sign for the government's broad case as well as the one at
hand.").
15. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 n.14.
16. Id. at 955.
17. See id. at 956 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("[A]lthough the majority claims to have
rooted its interpretation in antitrust law, [it] is in fact, inconsistent.").
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tions of the items as separate products. 8
The consistent problem with the analysis of the press, Microsoft, the
Court of Appeals and, ultimately, even Judge Wald's dissent, is that they are
all wrong. Only the District Court correctly articulated and applied the anti-
trust law's definition of a single product. 9 The answer to the single product
issue under antitrust law does not turn on whether there are plausible claims
of synergies or whether the synergies outweigh consumer preferences to
purchase the products separately. Rather, as the District Court stated, under
antitrust law "whether two products are involved depends on whether the ar-
rangement links two distinct product markets that are 'distinguishable in the
eyes of buyers.'".
This article provides an antitrust analysis of the single product issue
with respect to Microsoft's bundling of Internet Explorer web browser soft-
ware with Windows 95 and Windows 98. First, this article will look at the
test developed by the Court of Appeals under the terms of the 1994 consent
decree. Since the primary question addressed by this article is whether the
test employed by the Court of Appeals for an "integrated product" is con-
sistent with the test for a "single product" under antitrust law, this article as-
sumes that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the consent decree
even though the Court of Appeals failed to follow antitrust law. Consent de-
crees, after all, are generally interpreted as contracts between the parties
without direct reference to the underlying claims.2 This article will then
outline the test applied in antitrust tying cases to determine whether two
items constitute a single product. Next, this article will contrast the ap-
proaches of the Court of Appeals and Judge Wald's dissent for determining
whether Internet Explorer and Windows 95 constituted an integrated product
with the antitrust approach to the single product issue. Finally, this article
offers a tentative conclusion based on the evidence available to date as to
whether Internet Explorer and Windows 98 constitute a single product under
each of the three approaches.
18. See id. at 959.
19. See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 542-44.
20. Id at 542 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19-21
(1984)). See also PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 194 (1996) (Two products are
separate under antitrust law if there is sufficient consumer demand "to induce competitive
markets to provide them unbundled.").
21. As the Court of Appeals noted, interpretation of a consent decree is akin to con-
tract interpretation. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 946. ('The court's task is to discern the bar-
gain that the parties struck; this is the sense behind the proposition that consent decrees are
to be interpreted as contracts."). See also United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420
U.S. 223, 236-37 (1975) ("[S]ince consent decrees have many of the attributes of ordinary
contracts, they should be construed basically as contracts, without reference to the legisla-
tion the Government sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation.");
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682-83 (1971) (discussing construction of
contracts).
[Vol. 35
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I. THE TEST FOR INTEGRATION UNDER THE CONSENT DECREE
Section IV(E)(i) of the consent decree provides:
IV. Microsoft is enjoined and restrained as follows:
E. Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of
that agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon:
(i) the licensing of any other Covered Product,22 Operating System Software
Product or other product (provided, however, that this provision in and of itself
shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated prod-
ucts).
Given the ambiguity inherent in the term "integrated products,"'24 the
District Court refused to hold Microsoft in contempt for violating the con-
sent decree by forcing OEMs to install Internet Explorer with Windows 95.'
Ironically, the DOJ may have deliberately created this problem. It appears
that the DOJ agreed to the language in the consent decree so that treatment
of Microsoft's inclusion of new features in the OS would be decided on a
case by case basis rather than through broad injunctive relief. 6 The District
22. Section II(1) of the consent decree provides:
"Covered Products" means the binary code of (i) MS-DOS 6.22, (ii) Microsoft
Windows 3.11, (iii) Windows for Workgroups 3.11, (iv) predecessor versions of
the aforementioned products, (v) the product currently code-named "Chicago"
[Windows 95], and (vi) successor versions of or products marketed as replace-
ments for the aforementioned products, whether or not such successor versions
or replacement products could also be characterized as successor versions or re-
placement products of other Microsoft Operating System Software products that
are made available (a) as stand-alone products to OEMs pursuant to License
Agreements, or (b) as unbundled products that perform Operating System Soft-
ware functions now embodied in the products listed in subsections (i) through
(v). The term "Covered Products" shall not include "Customized" versions of the
aforementioned products developed by Microsoft; nor shall it apply to Windows
NT Workstation and its successor versions, or Windows NT Advanced Server.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) a 71,096 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
1995).
23. Section 1(14) of the consent decree provides:
"Operating System Software" means any set of instructions, codes, and ancillary
information that controls the operation of a Personal Computer System and man-
ages the interaction between the computer's memory and attached devices such
as keyboards, display screens, disk drives, and printers.
Id.
24. As one commentator noted, "the problem with this prohibition is that integrating
products at bottom is a tying arrangement." Bryce J. Jones, II & James R. Turner, Can an
Operating System Vendor Have a Duty to Aid Its Competitors?, 37 JuRIMETRIcs J. 355, 362
(1997).
25. See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 541.
26. See Response of the United States to Public Comments Concerning the Proposed
Final Judgment and Notice, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,426, at 59,428 (1994). In response to a com-
ment that the consent decree did not prevent Microsoft from stifling competition in markets
for complementary software products by including them with Windows, the DOJ pointed to
section IV(E)(i) in the consent decree and said that activity of this sort "requires case by
5
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Court also rejected Microsoft's argument that an integrated product included
any "product that 'combines' or 'unites' functions that, although capable of
functioning independently, undoubtedly complement one another"' because
this "interpretation would appear to render section IV(E)(i) essentially
meaningless."28 Noting that "[d]isputed issues of technological fact, as well
as contract interpretation abound,"29 the District Court tentatively found that
the Windows 95 and Internet Explorer did not constitute an integrated prod-
uct because "there exists sufficient independent consumer demand for oper-
ating systems and Internet access software 'so that it is efficient for a firm to
provide' those products 'separately' as Microsoft has concededly done."3
The Court of Appeals took an entirely different tact. It accepted Micro-
soft's argument that section IV(E)(i) resolved a complaint filed by Novell
with the European Union. Windows was originally an application that pro-
vided a graphical user interface (GUI) on IBM compatible computers. Al-
though Novell's OS, DR-DOS, could run Windows, Microsoft required
OEMs who wanted to install Windows to also install Microsoft's OS, MS-
DOS, effectively excluding Novell from the OEM distribution channel."
The Court of Appeals also noted that the consent decree seemed to treat Mi-
crosoft's Windows 95 OS as a single product.3 From this, the Court of Ap-
case analysis, and a broad injunction against such behavior generally would not be consis-
tent with the public interest." Id.
27. Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 541.
28. Id. at 543.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 544 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 462 (1992)).
31. The District Court had noted the same argument by Microsoft, but did not pass on
its veracity or draw any conclusions from it. See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 540 n.6. There
is reason to believe that this provision had its genesis with the FTC investigation. See
Stuart Taylor, Jr., What to Do With the Microsoft Monster, AMERICAN LAWYER, Nov. 1993,
at 72, 80. Nonetheless, it seems clear that section IV(E)(i) had its origins in the complaint
filed by Novell with the European Union. See Quentin Archer, Transatlantic Cooperation
and the Microsoft Case, 12 COMPUTER L. & SEcuRrry REP. 101 (1996).
32 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 945. See also Taylor, supra note 31, at 77 ("[The] most
devastating of Microsoft's allegedly predatory tactics was use of 'CPU licenses' (which
competitors call 'CPU lockout contracts') to pressure PC makers to deal exclusively with
Microsoft and shun [Novell's] DR DOS").
33. See id. at 946. The Court of Appeals stated that "the decree explicitly recognizes
[Windows 95] as a single product" simply because the decree's definition of Covered
Products included Windows 95. Nothing in the definition, however, necessarily precludes
the possibility that the DOJ perceived Windows 95 as two separate products, but chose to
exercise its prosecutorial discretion not to pursue the matter. As to the idea that Windows
95 did not constitute tying, one should consider the antitrust lawsuit filed by the current
owner of DR-DOS, Caldera Corp., against Microsoft alleging, inter alia, that Windows 95
illegally ties MS-DOS and Windows. See John R. Wilke, Microsoft Ordered to Give Com-
pany Windows 95 Code, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1998, at B5 ("'We want to use this code to
show a jury that Windows 95 was nothing more than an illegal tie of DOS and Windows,'
said Bryan Sparks, Caldera's chief executive."). See also Michael Moeller, Caldera to File
Amended Antitrust Complaint Against Microsoft, PC WEEK (Feb. 10, 1998)
<http://www.zdnet.com/peweek/news/0209/10ecald.html>; First Amended Complaint I
[Vol. 35
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peals concluded that the parties must have understood Windows 95 OS/GUI
combination to be an "integrated product" as defined by section IV(E)(i).'
Thus, concluded the Court of Appeals, whether the consent decree treated
the combination of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer as an integrated prod-
uct should turn on whether the Windows 95 and Internet Explorer bundle
was more like the permitted OS/GUI combination of Windows 95 or the
prohibited Windows 3.1 l/MS-DOS combination.
With its OS/GUI analogy in mind, the Court of Appeals said that an
integrated product under the consent decree "combines functionalities
(which may also be marketed separately and operated together) in a way that
offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and
combined by the purchaser. '36 The test utilized by the Court of Appeals has
two components. First, the bundle must have some degree of unity' that the
customer cannot create by combining the two products himself. 8 Second,
the bundle must create some type of synergy, i.e., the items "must also be
better in some respect"3 when they are combined than when they are sepa-
rated.40
The Court of Appeals said that combining early versions of Windows
with MS-DOS in one package would fail the first prong of the test because
the combination "offered purchasers nothing that they could not get by
buying the separate products and combining them on their own. '41 Windows
95, however, passed because "the two functionalities DOS and graphical
interface do not exist separately. '4 Likewise, the Windows 95/Internet Ex-
79(e), Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:96CV645B (D. Utah).
34. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 946 ('Whatever else § IV(E)(i) does, it must forbid a
tie-in between Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS, and it must permit Windows 95").
35. See id. (If "the relation between Windows 95 and IE is similar to the relation be-
tween Windows 3.11 and MS-DOS, the link is presumably barred by § IV(E)(i). On the
other hand, [i]f the Windows 95/IE combination is like the MS-DOS/graphical interface
combination that comprises Windows 95 itself, then it must be permissible.").
36. Id. at 948. In other words, "integration may be considered genuine if it is benefi-
cial when compared to a purchaser combination." Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 949.
37. See id. ("[Integration] suggests a degree of unity, something beyond merely plac-
ing the disks in the same box.").
38. See id. at 949 ("the combination offered by the manufacturer must be different
from what the purchaser could create from separate products on his own").
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 948.
42. Id. at 949. The Court of Appeals asserted that the same code which provided the
functions of MS-DOS also provided the GUI functions in Windows 95. See id. ("the code
that is required to produce one also produces the other"). Rather than citing evidence in
support of this proposition, the Court of Appeals simply asserted that separation of the two
functions would be "odd" and that it would result in two "disabled version[s] of Windows
95" requiring the customer to "repair" the software by installing both sets of "largely over-
lap[ping]" code on his computer. Id. One wonders how the Court of Appeals could reach
this conclusion without any evidence in the record as to the actual content and structure of
the source code for Windows 95.
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plorer combination also passed the first prong of the test because "Windows
95 without IE's code will not boot, and adding a rival browser will not fix
this. '43
The Court of Appeals felt that it did not have to apply the second prong
of the test to the Windows 95 OS/GUI combination because the existence of
synergy was implicit in the consent decree's "evident embrace of Windows
95 as a permissible single product."'  With respect to the Windows
95/Internet Explorer combination, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the
"evaluation should be narrow and deferential ' 45 to Microsoft because the ju-
diciary had "limited competence to evaluate high-tech product designs.
46
Thus, the issue of whether the combined product was "better in some re-
spect,"'47 should not turn on whether the "integrated product is superior to its
stand alone rivals"48 or even "whether ... [there] is a net plus '49 from the
combination, but "merely whether there is some plausible claim that it
brings some advantage.""0 Not surprisingly, Microsoft easily passed this test
simply by asserting some "facially plausible benefits"'" such as allowing
"applications to avail themselves of [browser] functionality without starting
up a separate browser."' Whether this or any other of the "facially plausible
benefits" identified by Microsoft actually exist is simply irrelevant.
The Court of Appeals rejected Judge Wald's contention that its test
gave Microsoft boundless discretion to bundle other products with the OS
because, the Court of Appeals insisted, there must be "some reason MicrQ-
soft, rather than the OEMs or end users, must bring the functionalities to-
gether."'53 Although one might think that this would have resolved the issue
43. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948 n.l1. As a factual matter, this claim is highly suspect.
See Russ Mitchell, Should Microsoft Be Able to Define What an "Operating System" Is?,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT (Dec. 15, 1997) <http:llwww.usnews.comlunews/news/russ.
html>. As to the claim that Windows 95 would break without Internet Explorer, "'[y]ou
probably can't use the word bullshit in print, right?' says Albert Woodhull, a computer sci-
ence professor." Id.
44. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 949.
45. Id. at 949-50.
46. Id. at 950 n.13. See also id. at 949 ("In antitrust law, the courts have recognized
the limits of institutional competence and have on that ground rejected theories of 'tech-
nological tying."').
47. Id. at 949.
48. Id. at 950.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. ld. at 951.
53. Id. at 952. This "limitation" appears to be based on the Court of Appeals' misin-
terpretation of commentary by Professor Elhauge in one the leading antitrust law treatises.
See Lisa M. Bowman, Professor: IE, Windows Are Separate Products, ZDNET (June 29,
1998) <http://www.zdnet.comlzdnnlstories/zdnn__smgraph-display/0,3441,2116055,00.
html> ("Elhauge argues that because a user can install Windows 95 with a series of sepa-
rate disks and a user may in fact want to purchase the OS without Internet Explorer the
products should be considered separate.").
[Vol. 35
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in favor of distinct products (Microsoft, after all, distributes Internet Ex-
plorer as a separate product that users can install on their own), the Court of
Appeals found that the bundling occurred not with installation, but with the
"inter-penetrating design" of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer.54 In other
words, the plausible, albeit unproven, benefits of the Windows 95/Internet
Explorer bundle could only result from Microsoft's access to the Windows
95 source code.55
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE SINGLE PRODUCT ISSUE
Under antitrust law, tying occurs when a seller agrees "to sell one prod-
uct [the tying product] only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product."' Tying violates section 1 of the Sherman Acts
"if the seller 'has appreciable economic power' in the tying product and if
the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied mar-
ket."'58 Antitrust law condemns tying under these circumstances because
"competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained."59
Since a single product may have many component parts, tying analysis
requires a determination of whether there are, in fact, two distinct products."
The treatise argues that bundling a previously separate software package with the OS does
not result in a single new product unless the OS and software package "operate better when
bundled together by the seller than they would if they were distributed on different disk-
ettes and installed by the buyer." AREEDA Er AL., supra note 20, at 229 (1996) (Professor
Elhauge apparently was the co-author responsible for this portion of the treatise). This ar-
gument does not support Microsoft's contention that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer
constituted a single product because Microsoft actually placed Windows 95 and Internet
Explorer on separate disks which were then combined by Microsoft's main customers, the
OEMs. See Einer Elhauge, Microsoft Gets an Undeserved Break, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
1998) <http://archives.nytimes.com/archives/search/fastweb?getdoc+arch365+db365+
164137+0++>.
Although Professor Elhauge's analysis does not support the Court of Appeals' contention
that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer constitute a single product, it is not entirely consis-
tent with antitrust law either. As will be shown in the next section, the test for whether two
items make up a single product under antitrust law depends on whether consumers want to
buy them separately.
54. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 952.
55. See id. ("[OEMs] could not, for example, make the operating system use the
browser's HTML reader to provide a richer view of information on the computer's hard
drive without changing the code to create an integrated browser.")
56. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
58. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992)
(citing Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
59. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). Accord Lisa M.
Judson, Note, Kodak v. Image Technical Services: The Taming of Matsushita and the Chi-
cago School, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1633, 1635 ("[A] seller should not be allowed to use power
enjoyed in one product market to advance its position in a quite distinct prQduct market on
a basis other than the seller's competitive merits.").
60. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462
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The Supreme Court addressed the single product issue in Jefferson Parish
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.6' The plaintiff in that case alleged that the
defendant hospital had engaged in illegal tying by requiring its surgery pa-
tients to purchase anesthesiology services from a single firm of anesthesi-
ologists. 2 The hospital argued that the arrangement did not involve two dis-
tinct products, but rather "a functionally integrated package of services."'
The Supreme Court squarely rejected this approach, holding that "the an-
swer to the question of whether one or two products are involved turns not
on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the
demand for the two items. ' In other words, the single product issue turns
on whether the products "were distinguishable in the eyes of buyers."'6
Thus, the Court found that two products existed in that case because the
"consumers differentiate between anesthesiological services and the other
hospital services."'66
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer demand
test in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.' The plaintiffs
in Kodak provided maintenance and repair services for photocopiers manu-
factured by the defendant.6 The defendant also provided parts and repair
services for the copiers.69 The lawsuit challenged the defendant's decision to
stop selling parts separately from services.70 The defendant argued that parts
and service constituted a single product "because ihere is no demand for
parts separate from service."' Again the Court squarely rejected the func-
tional approach, reiterating that it had often condemned product bundles as
tying arrangements when one of the bundled products was useless without
the other.72 Whether there are two distinct products depends on whether
there is "sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to pro-
vide service separately from parts."'73
(1992) ("['1o defeat a motion for summary judgment on (a] claim of a tying arrangement, a
reasonable trier of fact must be able to find, first, that [there] are two distinct products.").
See also Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969) ("There
is, at the outset of every tie-in case, the problem of determining whether two separate prod-
ucts are in fact involved.").
61. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
62. See id. at 5-7.
63. Id. at 18-19.
64. Id. at 19. See also Kurt A. Strasser, An Antitrust Policy for Tying Arrangements, 34
EMORY L.J. 253, 256 n.12 (1985) ("[Tlhe majority opinion's emphasis on consumer de-
mand behavior is central to its finding that two separate products were involved.").
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23.
67. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
68. See id. at 455.
69. See id
70. See id. at 463.
71. Id.
72. See id. (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.30).
73. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22). In other
[Vol. 35
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The type of evidence relied on in Kodak and Jefferson Parish is par-
ticularly instructive. In both instances, the Supreme Court looked to evi-
dence of actual market practices, rather than engineering models or cost ac-
counting techniques or presumptions based on economic theory.7 In
Jefferson Parish, the Court noted that the hospital billed anesthesiological
services separately from its other services." Furthermore, the hospital's own
anesthesiologist testified that consumers do in fact "'differentiate between
hospital services and anesthesiological services, and request specific anes-
thesiologists. ' 6 The Court in Kodak relied on the fact that the defendant had
sold service and parts separately in the past and continued to sell parts sepa-
rately to customers who serviced their own equipment." The Court went so
far as to point to the plaintiffs very existence as proof "of the efficiency of a
separate market for services.""
III. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST DOCTRINE TO WINDOWS 95
AND INTERNET EXPLORER
A. Comparison to the Court of Appeals' Integrated Product Test
The Court of Appeals seemed to reject altogether antitrust law's test for
distinct products when it stated that the consent decree's integration proviso
should be read "as permitting any genuine technological integration, re-
gardless of whether the elements of the integrated package are marketed
separately."' Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals characterized its test for
integration as "consistent with the antitrust laws."8 Careful examination of
the issue reveals that the Court of Appeals' test for integration is not con-
words, the existence of two products is established by proof of "an independent demand
and a market generated by that demand" for the each of the two items. Lawrence T. Festa,
III, Comment, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fall
of the Chicago Empire?, 68 NoTRE DAMEL. REv. 619, 646 (1993).
74. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 207 ("the single product inquiry does not
judge this policy question directly (by assessing cost efficiencies) but indirectly with more
easily obtained evidence regarding actual market practices"). See also id. at 208 ("[NMeither
Jefferson Parish nor Kodak inquired directly into the actual costs or quality of the items
bundled versus unbundled. Instead, the Court inferred the nature of consumer demand indi-
rectly from such more readily observed facts as actual consumer requests and market prac-
tices."). Compare Judson, supra note 59, at 1633 ("[Kodak] shift[ed] the focus of antitrust
[law] away from an assessment of economic plausibility and toward the use of economic
theory as a tool to explain market realities.").
75. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 23.
76. Id. at 23 n.36.
77. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462 ("Evidence in the record indicates that service and
parts have been sold separately in the past and still are sold separately to self-service
equipment owners.").
78. Id.
79. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948.
80. Id.
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sistent with either the methodology used or the results that would be pro-
duced by antitrust law.
The DOJ had argued to the Court of Appeals that the test for integration
under the consent decree, like the test for distinct products under antitrust
law, was whether "consumer demand exists for each separately,"'" but the
Court of Appeals basically ignored the consumer demand test articulated in
Kodak and Jefferson Parish stating that it was "not convinced that these in-
dicia necessarily point to separateness.""2 This appears to be nothing less
than a direct assault on the Kodak and Jefferson Parish decisions.
The Court of Appeals tried rather unconvincingly to reconcile its defi-
nition of integrated products under the consent decree with the Supreme
Court's consumer demand test. On the one hand, the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that the Supreme Court in Kodak "found parts and service sepa-
rate products because sufficient consumer demand existed to make separate
provision efficient."83 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals doubted that
the Supreme Court "would have subjected a self-repairing copier to the same
analysis."84 Even if consumers still sought to purchase parts separately from
the self-service feature of the copier, the Court of Appeals believed that the
existence of "separate markets for parts and service would not suggest that
such an innovation was really a tie-in."8
The Court of Appeals is correct, of course, that a self-repairing copier
would not constitute illegal tying, but the reason has nothing to do with
whether parts and service are separate products. The manufacturer in Kodak
had monopoly power in the aftermarket for parts, but not service.86 In the
Court of Appeals' hypothetical, service is not being bundled with parts, but
with the copier equipment. The manufacturer in Kodak, however, did not
have monopoly power in the equipment market.' Without monopoly power
in either the service or equipment market, bundling these two products could
not constitute an illegal tie-in."
Conditioning the purchase of the Court of Appeals' hypothetical copier
on the purchaser's agreement to purchase parts from the manufacturer pres-
81. Id. at 946.
82. Id. at 947.
83. Id. at 950.
84. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950.
85. Id.
86. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464-65
(1992).
87. Although the plaintiffs in Kodak disputed the manufacturer's lack of monopoly
power in the equipment market, the Supreme Court explicitly decided the case based on the
premise that "competition exists in the equipment market." Id. at 466 n.10.
88. See id. at 464 ("appreciable economic power in the tying market" is a "necessary
feature of an illegal tying arrangement"). See also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) ("[W]here the seller has no control or dominance over the tying prod-
uct any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be insig-
nificant.").
[Vol. 35
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ents a somewhat more problematic case. This seems much like a require-
ment that consumers purchase their toner and paper from the manufacturer.
The Supreme Court condemned a similar agreement as an illegal tying."
Nevertheless, bundling parts with a self-service copier may not violate the
antitrust law, but as with the service/copier bundle, the arrangement's legal-
ity would have nothing to do with the single product issue. Since the manu-
facturer in Kodak did not have monopoly power in the copier market, it
could not violate the law by tying repair parts to its copier sales. Further-
more, the manufacturer in Kodak only had monopoly power over parts in the
aftermarket because of the high information and switching costs that locked
consumers in to the manufacturer's parts after they purchased the equip-
ment.9" In other words, the manufacturer did not have appreciable economic
power in the parts market with respect to customers who had not already
purchased equipment. Therefore, if the parts were the tying product and the
self-repairing copier the tied product, then there would be no illegal tie-in
because the manufacturer would not have monopoly power in the tying
product.
Simply because the Court of Appeals failed to reconcile its methodol-
ogy with antitrust law does not mean that the two are necessarily incompati-
ble. Nonetheless, closer examination of the Court of Appeals' integrated
product test9e ' and the consumer demand test used in antitrust law reveals that
the two methods do indeed suffer from irreconcilable differences. First, the
Court of Appeals said that products may be integrated even if the two items
are also "marketed separately."92 Thus, the Court of Appeals squarely re-
fused to examine the very issue that proved essential to finding distinct
products in both Jefferson Parish and Kodak, i.e., whether sufficient con-
sumer demand existed to make it efficient to market the products sepa-
rately.93 This was not just so much rhetoric by the Supreme Court. In both
cases the Supreme Court placed heavy reliance on empirical evidence of the
separate marketing of the two items in question to support its holdings that
the items were distinct products.94
Second, the Court of Appeals' definition focuses on the functional rela-
tionship between the two items. Yet functionally integrated products may
still be separate products for tying purposes." For example, the first prong of
89. See Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (IBM required
lessees of its punch machines to purchase their punch cards from IBM).
90. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-78.
91. The Court of Appeals defined an integrated product as one that "combines func-
tionalities (which may also be marketed separately and operated together) in a way that of-
fers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and combined by the
purchaser." Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948. In other words, "integration may be considered
genuine if it is beneficial when compared to a purchaser combination." Id. at 949.
92. Id. at 948.
93. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462. See also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22.
94. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
95. See Allan M. Soobert, Antitrust Implications of Bundling Software and Support
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the Court of Appeals' test looks for the degree of unity which it found in
Windows 95's combining MS-DOS with Windows's graphical user inter-
face, i.e., "the code that is required to produce one also produces the
other."96 This does not answer the single product question under antitrust
law. Simply because two items were "created together does not mean it is
efficient and desirable to sell them bundled.""
Similarly, the Court of Appeals relied on its rather dubious assertion
that "the full functionality of the operating system when upgraded by [Inter-
net Explorer] and 'the browser functionality' of [Internet Explorer] do not
exist separately."9 The Court of Appeals repeatedly emphasized its belief
that Windows 95 would not function properly without Internet Explorer9 as
the "essential point" for finding that Microsoft had "not combined two dis-
tinct products." ' Both Jefferson Parish and Kodak rejected this argument
that functional linkage determined the existence of distinct products. Jeffer-
son Parish specifically stated that two distinct products could exist even if
Services: Unfit to Be Tied?, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 63, 79 (1995) ("Even though products
are functionally integrated or otherwise dependent on one another, such products neverthe-
less may be considered 'separate' for tying purposes.").
96. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 949.
97. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 215.
98. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 951-52. The Court of Appeals' characterization of the func-
tional relationship between Internet Explorer and Windows 95 is dubious at best. The Dis-
trict Court had found that the DOJ contested "Microsoft's claim that IE and Windows 95
are functionally integrated as a matter of software engineering." United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 542. See also Memorandum of the United States in Support of
Petition for an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not
Be Found in Civil Contempt at 27, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537
(D.D.C. 1997) (No. 94-1564) (citing evidence that the absence of Internet Explorer does
not affect the performance or functioning of Windows 95); Reply Brief of Petitioner United
States of America at 17, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997)
(No. 94-1564) (citing evidence that although Internet Explorer contains a file called
"COMCTL32" which is required for the Windows 95 to operate, COMCTL32 can be and
often is installed without the necessity of installing the entire Internet Explorer applica-
tion). As the DOJ pointed out, what Microsoft called Internet Explorer actually consisted of
a number of items, including both Microsoft's web browser and a number of shared librar-
ies. See Brief of Appellee United States at 22, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 97-5343). Although at least some of the shared libraries installed
by Internet Explorer are required for Windows 95 to work, the web browser feature is not
essential. According to the DOJ, Microsoft's own witnesses testified that version 3 of
Internet Explorer had been designed so that customers could "uninstall" the web browser.
See id. at 13. See also id. at 8 ("Microsoft advertises that Internet Explorer 3 'uninstalls
easily if you want to simply get rid of it."'). Furthermore, Microsoft did not require instal-
lation of version 4 of Internet Explorer as part of Windows 95 for five months after the ver-
sion 4 was released. See id. at 5. It is a little difficult to understand how Internet Explorer is
essential for Windows 95 to work if Windows 95 works (1) after one version of Internet
Explorer is removed and (2) without the installation of another version of Internet Explorer.
99. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948 n.11 ("Windows 95 without [Internet Explorer's]
code will not boot.").
100. IM
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"at least one is useless without the other.' '.. Not only did Jefferson Parish
state that the single product issue does not depend "on the functional rela-
tion between" the items in question,"° the Court also found that a strong
functional relationship between two items might exacerbate the anti-
competitive effects of bundling. 3
Numerous lower courts have rejected the Court of Appeals' functional
approach and applied the consmner demand test in a wide variety of antitrust
tying cases. In Digital Equipment Corp. v. System Indus., Inc.,"° for exam-
ple, Digital manufactured computers, peripheral storage devices for its com-
puters, and related items. System Industries, Digital's competitor in the pe-
ripheral market, alleged that Digital had tied the sale of its patented
interconnect products to its peripheral products.' 5 The court rejected Digi-
tal's claim that the interconnect and peripheral products constituted a single
product simply because "the two products are technologically interre-
lated."'0 6 Under Jefferson Parish, the Digital court said, "there can be 'pro-
hibited tying devices' even where products are 'functionally linked.""'
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found that diagnostic software used in
computer repairs and the repair service did not form a single product in
Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp.,"0' even though the software
was useless without the repair service. As the Fourth Circuit noted, "inquiry
into purpose and use is indistinguishable from the inquiry into the 'func-
tional relationship' between products that was rejected in Jefferson Par-
ish."' Instead, the determination rested on "whether there are customers
who would, absent an illegal agreement, purchase the tied product without
the tying product, and the tying product without the tied product.""0 Con-
101. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.30. Accord, AREEDA Er AL., supra note 20, at
270-71 ("A related test finds one product when the buyer needs both items ... [but this
test] departs greatly from precedent and would immunize our paradigmatic [anticompeti-
tive] tie."); Festa, supra note 73, at 646 n.160 ("The fact that one product is useless without
the other does not necessarily ensure that the court will find that there is only one prod-
uct.").
102. See also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19; Festa, supra note 73, at 646 n.158
("[The Jefferson Parish court explicitly rejected the use of the functional approach.").
103. See id. at 21 n.30 ("[I]n some situations the functional link between two items
may enable the seller to maximize its monopoly return on the tying item as a means of
charging a higher rent or purchase price to a larger user of the tying item.").
104. 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,901 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 1990).
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19 n.30).
108. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
109. Id. at 684.
110. Id. See also Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 211 (3d
Cir. 1994). Two distinct products exist if "there is sufficient demand for the purchase of the
tied product separate from the purchase of the tying product so as to identify a market
structure in which it is efficient to offer the tied product separately from the tying product."
Id.
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sistent with the analysis in Jefferson Parish and Kodak, the Fourth Circuit
examined actual marketing practices and deposition testimony as to whether
computers actually distinguished between the diagnostic software and the
repair service."'
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List,
Inc."' provides further support for this analysis. At issue in Thompson was
whether the defendant had tied membership in its realtor association with
access to its multi-list service."' The defendant in Thompson expressly ar-
gued that the two services "are in fact one product because they function as
one product,"" 4 were useless without each other, and could have been
structured so that membership was a "direct part of the multilist service. 1 5
The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that "such a functional argument is irrele-
vant to the question of whether there are or are not, separate markets.""' 6 In-
stead of arguments based on product design and functionality, the Eleventh
Circuit insisted on seeing evidence of actual "billing practices, consumer
preferences, consumer impressions, [and] the cross-elasticity of the markets"
to resolve the single product question."
Since Jefferson Parish, courts have consistently rejected functional ap-
proaches to the single product issue in favor of the consumer demand test.
Prior to Jefferson Parish, however, some antitrust cases did use a functional
approach. Even so, the Court of Appeals applied the functional test in a
manner inconsistent with these pre-Jefferson Parish decisions. For example,
in In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation,"' the defendant had devel-
oped both a computer CPU and an OS for the CPU. The plaintiffs, who were
rival CPU manufacturers, alleged that defendant had tied sales of its CPU to
its 0S.9 The defendant argued that the OS and CPU constituted a single
product.' Under the functional test for integration used by the Court of Ap-
peals, the OS and CPU surely would have formed a single product because
"neither item can function without the other.'' Data General, however, re-
jected this argument since the court looked to the "function of the aggrega-
tion" because "the relevant inquiry is not whether they must be used to-
gether but whether they must come from the same seller."'2
111. See Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 684.
112. 934 F.2d 1566 (1lth Cir. 1991).
113. See id. at 1574.
114. Id. at 1582 n.6.
115. Id. at 1575.
116. Id. at 1582 n.6.
117. Id. at 1575.
118. 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
119. See id. at 1097.
120. See id at 1104-07.
121. Id. at 1104. Compare Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948 n.11 ("Windows 95 without IE's
code will not boot.").
122. Data General, 490 F. Supp. at 1104. The Court of Appeals would undoubtedly
suggest that the Windows 95/Internet Explorer combination satisfied this test because the
[Vol. 35
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Third, the Court of Appeals wrongly associates product separateness
with a lack of synergy from bundling. Jefferson Parish, however, implicitly
rejected this analysis, insofar as the dissent argued that when "the economic
advantages of joint packaging are substantial[,] the package is not appropri-
ately viewed as two products.""' Even more troubling is the incredibly low
threshold that the Court of Appeals set for proof of the alleged synergies.
Although the Court of Appeals said that "commingling of code alone is not
sufficient evidence of true integration," 24 it refused to consider whether the
"facially plausible benefits" of bundling Windows 95 and Internet Explorer
actually existed." 1 Thus, the Court of Appeals effectively eliminated any
chance of determining whether the bundle actually produced any synergies,
or whether it simply amounted to a prohibited commingling of code. As
Judge Wald pointed out in her dissent, it "is difficult to imagine how Micro-
soft could not conjure up some technological advantage for any currently
Court of Appeals believed that not only was Internet Explorer required for Windows 95 to
boot, but also "adding a rival browser will not fix this." Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948 n.11.
The problem with this argument is that the Court of Appeals refused to consider the type
evidence relied on in Data General to assess the veracity of this claim by Microsoft.
Although Internet Explorer did install "shared libraries" used by Windows 95, the shared
libraries could be, and in fact often were, installed "by third party Independent Software
Vendors." Brief of Appellee United States at 45 n.3, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147
F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 97-5343). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it was a
"relatively common practice" for ISVs to install this software. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 951
n.16. But the Court of Appeals dismissed this evidence as irrelevant because it apparently
believed that ISVs were installing the entire Internet Explorer set of files, i.e., both the
shared libraries and the web browser, and because "there are some inefficiencies associated
with application vendors' redistribution of IE code." Id.
123. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 40 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). See also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698,
703-04 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining the differences and similarities between the consumer
demand/separate markets test and the synergy/economies of joint provision test). It is pos-
sible, of course, that the synergies from bundling would be so great that there would no
longer be sufficient consumer demand for the products separately. The Court of Appeals,
however, did not explore this possibility with respect to the Windows 95/Internet Explorer
bundle. Rather than looking into the effect that synergy had on consumer demand, the
Court of Appeals treated Microsoft's claim of synergy as proof that the bundle was a single
product.
124. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 949 n.12 ("Thus of course we agree with the separate
opinion that 'commingling of code... alone is not sufficient evidence of true integration.'
Commingling for an anticompetitive purpose (or no purpose at all) is what we refer to as
'bolting."').
The Court of Appeals also said that the consent decree would prohibit Microsoft from arti-
ficially rigging Windows 95 to crash if Internet Explorer were deleted. See id. at 949. ("The
concept of integration should exclude a case where the manufacturer has done nothing
more than to metaphorically 'bolt' two products together, as would be true if Windows 95
were artificially rigged to crash if IEXPLORE.EXE were deleted"). But by failing to in-
quire into actual content and operation of the software code, the Court of Appeals provided
no way of determining whether or not Microsoft had in fact "rigged" Windows 95 to fail
without Internet Explorer.
125. Microsoft, 147 F.3d. at 961 (Wald, J., dissenting). The court's test is not whether
the benefits exist, but whether "there is a 'plausible claim' that benefits exist. Id.
17
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separate software product it wished to 'integrate' into the operating sys-
tem.''h 6
Note that even if the dissent had prevailed in Jefferson Parish, the dis-
senters would have required a proof of "substantial" economic advantages
from bundling, a much higher standard than a "plausible claim" of "some
advantage" from bundling required by the Court of Appeals." Similarly,
pre-Jefferson Parish antitrust case law utilizing a synergies test required
evidence, not just "facially plausible claims," that such synergies existed.
Again, Data General is instructive. Although Data General focused primar-
ily on the functional relationship between the CPU and the OS, it also ap-
plied a synergy test as a "subsidiary consideration."' The defendant
claimed that bundling hardware and software together achieved synergies in
terms of "cost savings attributable to coordinated research and develop-
ment."'29 Data General rejected this claim, despite its facial plausibility, on
grounds that "the record lacks factual support.""' Unlike the Court of Ap-
peals, Data General demanded a "factual showing, beyond vague and con-
clusory references... of measurable economic benefits.' ' . Thus, the Court
of Appeals misapplied the now discarded synergy test by failing to allow
evidence as to the veracity of Microsoft's synergy claims.3 2
The Court of Appeals adopted such a low threshold for synergy because
it felt that courts have "limited competence to evaluate high-tech product de-
signs and the high cost of error."'33 While the difficulty of implementing an-
126. 1& It is equally difficult to believe that the DOJ would have agreed to a standard
that prohibited the DOJ from offering evidence that Microsoft had violated the standard.
127. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 ("The question is not whether the integration is a net
plus but merely whether there is a plausible claim that it brings some advantage."). Thus
the Court of Appeals has achieved the remarkable feat of developing a test that is inconsis-
tent with both the winning and losing arguments in Jefferson Parish. The Jefferson Parish
dissent found that surgery and anesthesia constituted one product because patients would
not consent to undergo surgery without anesthesia and vice versa. See 466 U.S. at 43. The
dissent treated this as a factual conclusion that should normally rest on evidence in the rec-
ord, except that in the case of surgery and anesthesia, the truth of the assertion was so ob-
vious that evidentiary support was not required. See id. at 43 n.12.
128. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1104 (1980).
129. Id. at 1105.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 1106.
132. This is especially appalling given that antitrust law generally holds that "a given
restriction is not reasonable, that is, its benefits cannot outweigh its harm to competition, if
a reasonable, less restrictive alternative exists that would provide the same benefits as the
current restraint." Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994)
(citing L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 726 F.2d 1381, 1396 (1984)). See also
Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1040 (4th Cir.
1987) ("An asserted business justification cannot salvage a tying arrangement that is oth-
erwise per se unlawful without proof that means less restrictive than the tie-in were not fea-
sible ... ."). By refusing to consider evidence that casts doubt on the veracity of Micro-
soft's claims, the Court of Appeals seemed to foreclose inquiry into whether the benefits
claimed by Microsoft could have been achieved in a less restrictive manner.
133. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 n.13.
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titrust standards in high technology fields is not to be doubted under some
circumstances, separation of the browser code from the rest of the OS should
be a relatively simple matter.'34 Furthermore, there is no basis for assuming
that the Supreme Court would carve out an exception so large as to exempt
software products almost entirely from tying claims.' Such an exception
would hardly serve the purposes of the antitrust law of tying: to ensure that
competitors are not denied free access to the market for the tied product and
that consumers are not "forced to forego their free choice between compet-
ing products."'3 6 Bundling of applications and OS software has no obvious
procompetitive effect.137 Unbundling, therefore, offers little risk of harm and
can "create real and substantial benefit in terms of increased competition and
innovation in the industry."'38
Other courts, moreover, have successfully applied the standard articu-
lated in Jefferson Parish and Kodak to high technology fields. In addition to
the cases discussed supra, the Ninth Circuit successfiully applied the con-
sumer demand test in a case where a manufacturer had created a "computer
system" that consisted of both the manufacturer's own computer and an OS
specifically designed by the manufacturer to run the computer.'39 There is
also something duplicitous about claiming that courts are incompetent to
evaluate whether Microsoft has bundled what are really two separate prod-
ucts for purposes of antitrust law, when courts do not hesitate to delve into
the mysteries of software engineering for other purposes. 4 ' Indeed, Micro-
134. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Microsoft as an Antitrust Target: IBM in Software?, 25 Sw.
U. L. REv. 671, 736 (1996) ("For several years, Microsoft has touted its modular software
development and object-oriented software design, which ought to make extrication of the
Internet browser a relatively simple matter."). What Microsoft called Internet Explorer ac-
tually consisted of a number of items, including both Microsoft's web browser and a num-
ber of shared libraries. See Brief of Appellee United States at 22, United States v. Micro-
soft Corp., No. 97-5343, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13242 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1998). The
Court of Appeals ignored considerable evidence that the web browser could be separated
from the rest of the OS, including the facts that version 3 of Internet Explorer had been de-
signed so that customers could "uninstall" the web browser. Id. at 13. See also id. at 8
("Microsoft advertises that Internet Explorer 3 'uninstalls easily if you want to simply get
rid of it."') Microsoft did not require installation of version 4 of Internet Explorer as part of
Windows 95 for five months after version 4 was released. See id. at 5.
135. See PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 817 (6th Cir.
1997) ("While we are mindful of the various efficiency gains that can accrue to both sup-
pliers and customers from bundling certain products together, we are confident that the an-
titrust laws provide the tools to distinguish between meritorious and non-meritorious
claims.").
136. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
137. See Dratler, supra note 134, at 737 ("[IThe case for the procompetitive effect of
bundling application software with operating systems appears shaky.").
138. Id. at 738.
139. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984)
("[T]he district court's analysis of defendant's 'single product' claim is supported by the
Supreme Court's recent discussion in Jefferson Parish .... [A] demand existed for NOVA
instruction set CPUs separate from defendant's RDOS.").
140. See generally Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) (copyright
19
Hawker: Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue and the Tying Claims
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
soft itself benefitted from judicial willingness to "dissect" computer code in
a copyright infringement lawsuit brought by Apple Computer.'4
Nor does the Court of Appeals' desire to avoid enmeshing the courts in
an inquiry "into the justifiability of product innovations" create an exception
to the consumer demand test for distinct products.'42 The Court of Appeals
purports to rely on the Fifth Circuit opinion in Response of Carolina, Inc. v.
Leasco Response, Inc.,'" a case decided nearly a decade before Jefferson
Parish. The Fifth Circuit, moreover, rested its holding that no tying oc-
curred, not on the proposition that the items in question constituted a single
product, but on grounds that the agreements involved in Response did not
require the consumers to purchase both items.'" Although the Fifth Circuit
expressed concern about judicial scrutiny of product innovations, the Fifth
Circuit did not suggest that labeling the combination of two previously sepa-
rate products a "product innovation" automatically exempted the manufac-
turer's conduct from the usual standards of antitrust law. Indeed, the Fifth
Circuit specifically stated that "two products might be illegally tied through
the technological relationship between them.""' The Fifth Circuit would
simply limit an inquiry into whether the technological relationship between
two items constituted tying to cases where the record contained evidence
that the manufacturer had designed the technological relationship "for the
purpose of tying the products, rather than to achieve some technologically
beneficial result.'. 46 Unlike the Court of Appeals, which would cut off in-
quiry whenever the manufacturer makes a "plausible claim" of consumer
benefits from bundling,'47 the Fifth Circuit would require actual "evidence"
law); Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (copyright
law); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(patent law); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 97-20884 RMW(PVT),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4461 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1998) (trademark law). See also James W.
Morando & Christian H. Nadan, Do Software Patents 'Stac' the Deck Against Competition,
COMPUrER LAw,, Apr. 1994, at 1 (discussing Microsoft's loss of a patent infringement law-
suit alleging that Microsoft copied portions of the defendant's software into MS-DOS).
141. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
142. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 (citing Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response,
Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976)).
143. 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
144. See id at 1327 ("We find no evidence of coercion on the part of Leasco and thus
affirm the directed verdict on the issue of tying."). There is reason to believe that had the
Fifth Circuit applied the consumer demand test, it would have found that the two items at
issue-computer hardware and a franchise agreement-constituted a single product, not
because of the functional relationship between the two products or because of an exception
for product innovations but because the evidence indicated that consumers viewed the
computer hardware and the franchise as a single product. Id. at 1330 ('We can find no
proof that any of the franchisees desired to purchase or lease the hardware from someone
other than Leasco, or conversely, that any of them ever envisioned the purchase of the fran-
chise without the lease of the hardware.").
145. Id. at 1330.
146. Id.
147. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950.
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as to the manufacturer's purpose for creating the technological interrelation-
ship.
148
The recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in Multistate Legal Studies,
Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications,
Inc.,49 provides a more appropriate analogy for determining the effect of
product innovation on the single product issue under antitrust law than Re-
sponse. The defendant in Multistate sold bar exam review courses.15' is-
torically, the defendant had offered two products. The first, a full service
course, covered all of the components of the bar exam, but gave relatively
limited coverage of the multistate portion of the exam.' The second, a sup-
plemental multistate workshop, gave extensive coverage of the multistate
portion of the exam." The plaintiff competed with the defendant in the
workshop market and alleged that the defendant had begun to illegally tie
the defendant's workshop to the full service course. Using reasoning
strikingly similar to that of the Court of Appeals, the District Court in
Multistate held that "any effort to improve the full service course by adding
elements to it could not possibly constitute the bundling of a second prod-
uct."''" The Tenth Circuit squarely rejected the idea of an automatic excep-
tion for product innovations, stating that "[piroduct improvements may be
the cause and/or effect of changes in consumer demand, but the nature of
148. Response, 537 F.2d at 1330. The Court of Appeals also seemed to place some re-
liance on two opinions by District Court Judge Conti in litigation involving IBM: ILC Pe-
ripheral Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), and ILC Peripheral Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 949-50. Neither of Judge
Conti's opinions have any bearing on whether the Court of Appeals subjected Microsoft's
Windows 95/Internet Explorer bundle to a test that was consistent with antitrust law. Both
were issued six years before the Supreme Court adopted the consumer demand test in Jef-
ferson Parish. In the first opinion, Judge Conti applied the functional test, stating that "the
court must ... review the evidence with an eye to the 'function' of the aggregation," 448 F.
Supp. at 231, but the Supreme Court rejected this functional test later in Jefferson Parish
and Kodak.
In the second opinion, Judge Conti urged some deference to the manufacturer's choice in
product design monopolization case where "there is a difference of opinion as to the ad-
vantages of two alternatives which can both be defended from an engineering standpoint."
458 F. Supp. at 439. As the Tenth Circuit has noted, whatever merit the "product improve-
ment" defense may have under section 2, it does not apply to the determination of whether
two items are separate products for tying analysis. See Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1577
nn.9-10 (10th Cir. 1995).
149. 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995).
150. See id. at 1544.
151. See id. at 1546.
152. See id at 1544 ('"Two types of bar review courses are relevant to this litigation:
'full-service' courses, designed to prepare students for all components of a jurisdiction's
bar examination, and 'supplemental multistate workshops,' which prepare students only for
the MBE portion of ajurisdiction's bar exam.").
153. See id. at 1545-46.
154. Id at 1547.
21
Hawker: Consistently Wrong: The Single Product Issue and the Tying Claims
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
that demand is what counts."'55 Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 56 the
Tenth Circuit insisted, "a product improvement motivation will not save
otherwise illegal tying arrangements."'" Thus, the Tenth Circuit, unlike the
Court of Appeals, did not abandon the consumer demand test mandated by
Jefferson Parish and Kodak, even though it required inquiry into the justifi-
ability of the defendant's product design and innovation.'5'
Since the methodology used by the Court of Appeals to determine the
existence of an "integrated product" differs completely from that used by
antitrust law, the question arises as to whether the Court of Appeals' inte-
grated product test is consistent with antitrust law, at least insofar as it pro-
duces the same result. Because the Court of Appeals' test focuses on func-
tionality and synergy instead of consumer demand, the Court of Appeals'
opinion contains little information relevant to the antitrust inquiry. The clos-
est the Court of Appeals itself came to evaluating evidence of consumer de-
mand was its repeated observation that Netscape had characterized Internet
Explorer as an OS upgrade.'59 Assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly
understood Netscape's remark,'6 this evidence does suggest that consumers
do not distinguish between web browser and OS software. What really mat-
ters, however, is not how the manufacturer's. competitors view the items, but
how consumers perceive them. Furthermore, most of the evidence of con-
sumer demand that can be gleaned from the Court of Appeals' opinion sug-
gests that consumers do in fact perceive Internet Explorer and Windows 95
as distinct products.
The DOJ argued that Microsoft treated Internet Explorer as a separate
product, pointing out that Microsoft (1) provides Internet Explorer sepa-
rately to end users, (2) sells versions of Internet Explorer for different OSs,
(3) advertises Internet Explorer as a distinct product, (4) tracks Internet Ex-
plorer's performance in a "browser market," and (5) distributes Internet Ex-
155. l at 1556 n.4.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1998).
157. See Multistate, 63 F.3d at 1557 n.9.
158. The Tenth Circuit did indicate that product improvements might constitute a de-
fense to certain types of monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 1551 ("Product improvement can sometimes be a de-
fense to a section 2 claim."). Even so, this would require an inquiry into "[b]oth the
purpose and results of a product change, including customers reception of the change, [to
determine] whether a claimed product improvement is pro- or anticompetitive." Id. Al-
though the Tenth Circuit conceded that the "difficulties and dangers" of subjecting product
improvements to this analysis in cases of "complex technological integration of previously
separate functions" might justify some "degree of deference to product designers" in sec-
tion 2 cases, the Tenth Circuit insisted that whatever test was appropriate for section 2
cases had nothing to do with the need to apply the consumer demand test to tying claims
under section 1. Id. at 1557 nn.9-10.
159. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 946, 952.
160. The Court of Appeals gives no context for this statement. It is difficult to believe
that Netscape actually asserted a belief that there is no distinction between web browsers
and OS since Netscape sells web browser software but does not sell an OS.
[Vol. 35
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plorer on a separate CD-ROM from Windows 95."'
As the Court of Appeals noted, the fact that Microsoft has shipped
Internet Explorer to consumers on a separate disk may have more to do with
the storage capacity of the disk than with whether the products are distinct. 62
Also, the Court of Appeals' suggestion that versions of Internet Explorer
"developed for different operating systems may be better understood as dif-
ferent products altogether"'63 is not entirely without merit, but extrinsic evi-
dence that top Microsoft officials take pride in the fact that the versions of
Internet Explorer for other OSs have "the same features as the Windows ver-
sion, the same command structure, the same user interface, [and] THE
SAME CODE BASE""M substantially weakens the validity of this inference.
More importantly, the remainder of the evidence put forward by the DOJ
strongly suggests that Internet Explorer is a distinct product.65
Courts have always relied heavily on actual sales of the tied product,
separate from the tying product, in finding distinct products.'66 In Kodak, for
instance, the Court pointed to evidence indicating that the tied and tying
products had been "sold separately in the past and still are sold sepa-
rately."'" In Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., the Eleventh Cir-
cuit noted that consumers could obtain the tied product (the Realtor mem-
bership) without purchasing the tying product (access to the multilist).'69
Consequently, the separate provision and sales of the Windows 95 version
of Internet Explorer (the tied product) by Microsoft strongly suggests that
Internet Explorer and Windows 95 are distinct products.
161. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 946.
162. See id at 947 ("Distribution of software code on a separate CD-ROM shows
nothing at all about whether the code is integrated into an operating system (software for an
operating system that is clearly a single product may take up many disks).").
163. Id. at 948.
164. Cringely, supra note 8 (emphasis in original). Microsoft now claims that "soft-
ware programs providing web browsing functionality created for use with non-Microsoft
operating systems have different features and functionality and are built on different code
bases from software providing web browsing functionality in Windows." Defendant Micro-
soft Corporation's Answer to the Complaint Filed by the U.S. Department of Justice I
21(b)(i), United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
165. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 946.
166. See PSIRepair Services, 104 F.3d at 816 (finding evidence the manufacturer "it-
self sells components" separately to certain customers tends to show circuit board repair
services and components are distinct products). See also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1179-80 (1st Cir. 1994) (licensing of diagnostic software without
sales of computer repair services suggests that software and service are separate products);
Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
computer upgrades and labor for installation are distinct products).
167. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
168. 934 F.2d 1566 (llth Cir. 1991).
169. See id at 1575 ("[A]ll of the relevant evidence.., indicates that the market for
professional affiliation is separate from the market for multilist services. For example,
there is evidence ... that a broker can join the Realtors and choose not to use the multilist
service.").
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Evidence that Microsoft advertised and tracked Internet Explorer sepa-
rately from Windows 95 does not directly prove two distinct products (it is,
after all, consumers' perception, not Microsoft's, that matters), but it shows
that Microsoft not only believed consumers separately demanded Internet
Explorer-such evidence also shows that Microsoft attempted to stimulate
consumer demand for Internet Explorer as a distinct product.
Courts applying antitrust's consumer demand test have also relied on
the historical existence of competitors in the tied product market as evidence
that the tying and tied products are distinct.7 ' Therefore, the Court of Ap-
peals' acknowledgement of Netscape as Microsoft's rival also tends to es-
tablish that separate consumer demand exists for Internet Explorer and Win-
dows 95.
The Court of Appeals simply ignored the most compelling evidence of-
fered by the DOJ to prove that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer are sepa-
rate products, i.e., testimony from Microsoft's own witnesses acknowledg-
ing "corporate customer demand for a version of Windows 95 that did not
permit employees to 'access the Internet and spend all their time surfing the
web."""' The DOJ's brief also cited a 1998 study of 200 information tech-
nology managers by Infoweek magazine which showed that "34% 'want the
browser to remain separate' from Windows and that only 28% want the
browser to be included with Windows." '
Application of the consumer demand test to the relevant evidence dis-
cussed in the Court of Appeals' opinion, as well as the additional evidence
cited in the DOJ's brief, leaves little doubt that Internet Explorer and Win-
dows 95 are distinct products under the antitrust law of tying. Thus, what-
ever merit the Court of Appeals' opinion may have as precedent for inter-
pretation of similar language in other consent decrees, it has nothing to say
about whether Microsoft's decision to combine Internet Explorer with Win-
dows 95 constitutes illegal tying under section 1 of the Sherman Act.174
170. See PSIRepair Services, 104 F.3d at 816 (the "very existence" of a competitor in
the service market who does not manufacture parts suggests that parts and service are dis-
tinct products). See also Thompson, 934 F.2d at 1575-76 (existence of competitor Realtor
groups who do not offer multilist services suggests that Realtor membership and multilist
service are separate products).
Again, Kodak exemplifies this point with the Court stating that the existence of develop-
ment competitors in the tied product "is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for
service." Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462.
171. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 947.
172. Brief of Appellee United States at 13, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No.
975343, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13242 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1998).
173. Id. at 45 n.6.
174. In fact, Microsoft's bundling of Internet Explorer and the Windows OS would
seem to present exactly the type of case where tying should be condemned as illegal per se.
In Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988), then
Judge, now Justice, Breyer surveyed some of the harms caused by tying and noted:
[A] Seller, possessing significant market power with respect to Product A, may
cause anticompetitive harm by tying as follows: by reducing the price of Product
[Vol. 35
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B. Comparison to Judge Wald's Integrated Product Test
The Court of Appeals' decision sparked a rather sharp and cogent dis-
sent by Judge Wald. She disagreed with the apparent holding that the con-
sent decree was susceptible to only one interpretation, especially in light of
the fact that the Court of Appeals had remanded the case back to the District
Court "for further factual development that may well be relevant to the most
A slightly (or by otherwise not fully exploiting its power with respect to Product
A), the Seller may induce the Buyer to accept the tie; by doing so, the Seller
may build a strong market position in Product B; and that position in Product B,
in turn, may increase its power to charge high prices in respect to Product A. If a
monopolist of patented can-closing machinery, for example, insists, as a condi-
tion of selling his machines, that their purchasers buy his cans, he will likely
soon have a monopoly in cans as well as machines. And, that fact-the fact that
he controls both cans and machines-may make his monopoly safer from com-
petitive attack when his patent on the can-closing machinery expires. A new
competitor would then have to enter both levels of the business (cans and ma-
chines) to deprive him of monopoly profits. And, this added security may enable
the machinery monopolist to charge higher prices. The tie, by permitting the
Seller to extend its market power from one level to two, may thereby raise entry
barriers, providing security that helps a monopolist-seller further harm the con-
sumer.
Id. at 795-96.
Microsoft is essentially in the position of Judge Breyer's can-closing monopolist. Microsoft
has a monopoly in OS software for personal computers, Product A. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 145 ("Microsoft dominates the world market for operating systems software that runs on
IBM-compatible personal computers"); Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 539 ("Microsoft has en-
joyed for some time a virtual monopoly in the sale of PC operating system software, and
presently possesses a market share approaching eighty percent."). Consequently, if Micro-
soft insists, as a condition of selling its OS, that consumers purchase its web browser,
Product B, Microsoft will likely soon have a monopoly in both OS and web browsing soft-
ware. The only way Netscape or some other web browser manufacturer could hope to com-
pete successfully with Microsoft is if the competitor simultaneously entered both the OS
and web browser market.
Just as the can-machine monopolist is preparing for the day its machine patent expires, so
too Microsoft's monopolization of the web browser market serves as preparation for and
maybe even avoids the day when browsers reach their potential as an alternative to the OS
for running application software. As the Court of Appeals noted:
Browsers have the potential to serve as user interfaces and as platforms for ap-
plications (which could then be written for the APIs of a particular browser
rather than of a particular operating system), providing some of the traditional
functions of an operating system. Widespread use of multi-platform browsers as
user interfaces has some potential to reduce any monopoly-increasing effects of
network externalities in the operating system market. Browsers can enable the
user to access applications stored on the Internet or local networks, or to operate
applications that are independent of the operating system.
Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 939-40. With a monopoly in both the OS and browser markets,
therefore, Microsoft can maintain its position as the platform that all OEMs must install
and all applications must be written for. In other words, purchasing Microsoft's platform
(be it the Windows OS or Internet Explorer) is the price all consumers must pay to use a
personal computer.
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faithful interpretation of the section."' 5 More importantly, and not surpris-
ingly, Judge Wald found that the Court of Appeals' interpretation conflicted
with antitrust law. She then offered her own interpretation as "more conso-
nant with the intent of the drafters [of the consent decree] and the weight of
antitrust law."'76 Nonetheless, Judge Wald's interpretation of section
IV(E)(i) is not entirely consistent with antitrust law either.
Judge Wald's dissatisfaction with the Court of Appeals' interpretation
rested largely on the fact that it renders the consent decree's ban on bundling
all but meaningless.'" The Court of Appeals' "considerable deference to Mi-
crosoft's plausible claims of advantage, coupled with Microsoft's privileged
knowledge of the inner workings of its operating system, barely raises the
bar of section IV(E)(i) above ground level."'78 The Court of Appeals, argued
Judge Wald, would "permit Microsoft to 'integrate' word-processing soft-
ware programs, spreadsheets, financial management software, and virtually
any other now-separate software product into its operating system by identi-
fying some minimal synergy associated with such 'integration."" 79 Indeed,
nothing in the Court of Appeals' opinion would prevent Microsoft from
conditioning its license of Windows 95 on the OEM's purchase of Microsoft
brand mice "so long as Microsoft had the prescience to include code in
Windows 95 that made the cursor more responsive to the end user's touch
than it would be with other mice. '""' As to the concern that Windows 95
175. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 956 (Wald, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 957 (arguing the majority's "reading does not impose nearly enough scru-
tiny on 'integration' and renders the central prohibition of section IV(E)(i) largely use-
less.").
178. Id. at 961.
179. Id. at 962.
180. Id. at 957. The Court of Appeals agreed that it would apply the same analysis to
bundling mice with the OS that it did to bundling web browser software with the OS.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals thought it "unlikely that a plausible claim could be made
that a mouse and an operating system were integrated in the sense that neither could be said
to exist separately." Id. at 948 n. 11. Windows 95 and Internet Explorer were different than
the mouse/OS combination, the Court of Appeals claimed, because "Windows 95 without
IE's code will not boot." Id. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' suggestion, Microsoft could
put code into its OS which check to see if a Microsoft mouse had been installed and if a
Microsoft was not found, the OS would then refuse to boot. Indeed, Microsoft has a well-
established history of designing its products to inhibit the use of competitors' software. See
Kathleen Murphy, A Reluctant Witness Against Microsoft, INTERNET WORLD, July 27, 1998,
at 1, 4 ("Glaser's specific contention is that Microsoft has deliberately programmed its own
Windows player expected to be bundled in future versions the Windows operating system
in a way that disables RealNetworks's player."). See also Jones & Turner, supra note 24, at
361 (Microsoft's tactics include modifying Windows to give a warning when Windows was
loaded from a non-Microsoft OS); Baseman, supra note 6, at 277-78 (arguing that Micro-
soft sabotaged competitors' products); James Gleick, Making Microsoft Safe for Capital-
isin, NY. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, § 6, at 50 (describing how installation of Internet Explorer
disables competing browsers, including Netscape, and how Windows 95 "carefully and ex-
plicitly replaces" certain types of non-Microsoft software previously installed by the user).
Thus, as Judge Wald pointed out, the mouse and OS would be a single product under the
[Vol. 35
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would not boot without Internet Explorer, Judge Wald suggested that this
might be nothing but a sham.'81 Although she sympathized with the concern
about involving the courts in product design, she would not endorse "judi-
cial abdication in the face of complexity.'
' 82
Judge Wald also criticized the Court of Appeals for failing to adhere to
antitrust law."3 The test under Jefferson Parish, Judge Wald correctly stated,
looks to "whether the arrangement tied two distinct markets for products
that are separate from the buyer's perspective,"'" but the Court of Appeals
departed "from this precedent by accepting any 'plausible claim' that the
combination (i.e., the design) offers 'some advantage. '"'""S Internet Explorer
may share code with Windows 95 in a way that others browsers do not, but
"the fact that parts of Internet Explorer share code with the operating system
and thus with other applications should not end the analysis any more than
did the fact that the anesthesiologists in Jefferson Parish shared hospital
equipment and personnel with the hospital and its staff."' 86 Separate product
analysis under antitrust law requires consideration of whether "consumers
desire to purchase-and hence that manufacturers desire to supply-a sub-
stitute for Internet Explorer from another manufacturer."'" The Court of
majority's test because "the full functionality of the patented mouse and Microsoft's
mouse-friendly operating system would not exist separately and their full functionality
would only exist when combined." Id. at 957 n.l.
The majority also suggested that the mouse/OS combination differed from the Win-
dows95/Internet Explorer bundle "because their physical existence makes it easier to iden-
tify the act of combination." Id. at 948 n.11. As Judge Wald noted, this seems "to misstate
the majority's own test." Id. at 957 n.l. The majority had said that Windows 95 and Inter-
net Explorer were a single product even if they shipped on separate disks and the customer
installed them. Id. at 949 ("in such a case it would not be meaningful to speak of the cus-
tomer 'combining' two products"). Furthermore, as Judge Wald pointed out, "the major-
ity's test would consider whether the design that 'knits together' Microsoft's mouse and the
operating system offers advantages unavailable through the combination of a competitor's
mouse and the operating system." Id. at 957 n.1. Since only Microsoft has access to the
source code for Windows 95, Microsoft and Microsoft alone could design the OS to look
for and only boot upon finding (or otherwise take advantage of the special features of) Mi-
crosoft's mouse. Thus, mouse/OS combination would be something "OEMs cannot do," Id.
at 952, and, therefore, the combination would be a single product under the majority's test.
181. "An operating-system designer who wished to turn two products into one could
easily commingle the code of two formerly separate products, arranging it so that 'Win-
dows 95 without IE's code will not boot,' so that Windows 95 without Internet Explorer
would 'represent a disabled version of Windows 95,' and so that Internet Explorer instructs
the Add/Remove function to leave so much of that program in place that 'four lines of pro-
gramming' will suffice to activate it." Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 958 (Wald, J., dissenting)
(quoting from the majority opinion, id. at 949 n.11, 952 n.17).
182. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 959 n.3 (Wald, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 956 ("[A]lthough the majority claims to have rooted its interpretation in
antitrust law, it interprets section IV(E)(i) in a way that is, in fact, inconsistent with at least
some governing precedent.").
184. Id. at 960 (Wald, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 961.
186. Id. at 962.
187. Id.
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Appeals "effectively exempts software products from antitrust analysis,' 88
even though other courts have applied Jefferson Parish's consumer demand
test "in the technological realm."'89 Indeed, the ease with which one could
divide and recombine software code as compared to physical products calls
for "closer, rather than more relaxed, scrutiny of Microsoft's claims of inte-
gration."'
9
'
t
Having correctly identified the antitrust test for distinct products and
noting its applicability to technological products, Judge Wald departed from
it by calling for application of a two factor balancing test. 9' Consistent with
antitrust doctrine, Judge Wald would require "independent evidence that a
genuine market exists for the two products provided separately."'9 While
antitrust law would resolve the single product issue with this evidence alone,
Judge Wald would also look for synergies from bundling as a second fac-
tor. "'93 Judge Wald would then balance these two factors such that the
"greater the evidence of distinct markets, the more of a showing of synergy
Microsoft must make in order to justify incorporating what would otherwise
be an 'other' product into an 'integrated' whole."'94 Jefferson Parish implic-
itly rejected the idea that synergies could trump actual consumer demand
when Justice O'Connor advocated this idea in dissent. 95 Nonetheless, even
"if there are clearly two distinct markets" for OS and web browser software,
Judge Wald would treat Windows 95 and Internet Explorer as a single prod-
uct provided that "substantial synergies" resulted from the combination.'96
It is especially ironic that Judge Wald felt the need to add synergies as a
factor to the antitrust test since she went out her way to state that "traditional
antitrust analysis and the usual methods of the law" provided adequate tools
for resolving the single product issue."' Judge Wald's apparent belief that
"antitrust analysis requires balancing" consumer demand against synergies
may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the role that efficiency plays
in the analysis. 9 ' After observing that Kodak stated the test in terms of
whether sufficient consumer demand exists to make it "efficient" to provide
separately, Judge Wald indicated that the "difficulty in this case is that tech-
nological evolution can change the boundaries of what is efficient."'99 It is
true that if bundling creates significant synergies, as in the case of belts and
188. Id. at 958.
189. Id. at 960 (Wald, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 958.
191. See id. at 959.
192. Id. at 958.
193. See id. at 957 ("... evidence that there are real benefits to the consumer associ-
ated with integrating two software products; I call these benefits 'synergies').
194. Id. at 959.
195. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 959 (Wald, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 958.
198. Id. at 959 n.5.
199. Id. at 958.
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buckles, sufficient consumer demand for them as separate items will cease,
i.e., most, if not all, consumers will no longer want to purchase belts and
buckles from separate vendors."' Thus, the efficiency considerations are im-
plicit in the consumer demand test. There is simply no need for judicial bal-
ancing of synergies against consumer demand. The best way to account for
synergy is to let consumers decide the single product issue by providing
them with the products in both bundled and unbundled form.
Perhaps Judge Wald feared that courts would erroneously condemn
competitive product innovations as illegal tying arrangements. In an effort to
illustrate the difficulty that she found with applying the consumer demand
test to technological innovations, Judge Wald suggested that digital cameras
do not constitute two distinct products even though cameras and film have
traditionally been sold as separate items.0' A digital camera, however, en-
tirely eliminates the need for film altogether. Microsoft's combination of
Windows 95 with Internet Explorer, however, does not eliminate the need
for browser software, it simply mixes that software code with other bits of
code. Disposable cameras would provide a much closer analogy to the Win-
dows 95/Internet Explorer bundle since "disposable" cameras require the
consumer to purchase the camera and the film together in much the same
way that Microsoft's mixing of web browser and OS software code requires
consumers to purchase both. Since consumers still demand and manufactur-
ers still provide cameras and film separately, the disposable camera consists
of two separate products under antitrust law. 2 This does not mean, how-
ever, that the sale of disposable cameras violates antitrust law. Given the
prevalence of multiple sources of traditional cameras and film, it would be
nonsense to suggest that a disposable camera constituted an illegal tying ar-
rangement. Not only because a disposable camera manufacturer would lack
the necessary market power to force consumers to accept the tie, but also be-
cause antitrust law does not condemn bundling when both items are also
available separately. Although only the narrow question of whether Win-
dows 95 and Internet Explorer were distinct products was at issue, Judge
Wald need not have feared that a finding of distinct products would neces-
sarily have prohibited Microsoft from the two pieces of software. So long as
Microsoft also offered Windows 95 without Internet Explorer, antitrust law
200. Compare Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 699, 703-04
(1984) (finding that Jefferson Parish advocated a "separate markets" approach). Nonethe-
less, if despite the synergies a sufficient number of consumers idiosyncratically desire to
purchase the two items separately so that it is profitable for some firms to sell only belts or
only buckles, belts and buckles would remain separate products for antitrust purposes. Cf.
id. at 704.
201. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 958 (Wald, J., dissenting).
202. This assumes, of course, that consumers' demand is not such that disposable
cameras make up their own relevant market, distinct from traditional cameras. If the cross-
elasticities of demand between traditional and disposable cameras are such that they are
two separate markets, then it is probable that consumers in the disposable camera market
would not view the camera and the film as distinct products.
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would not prohibit Microsoft from also offering them in combination.
As previously noted, significant synergies from combination may
eliminate consumer demand for the items as two separate products, trans-
forming the two items into a single product. Thus, the question arises
whether Judge Wald's two factor balancing test would produce the same re-
sult as antitrust law with respect to the Windows 95/Internet Explorer bun-
dle. The specific evidence that Judge Wald would consider suggests that her
test, like antitrust law, would treat Windows 95 and Internet Explorer as
separate products. Both Judge Wald and antitrust law would examine "(1)
whether manufacturers of other operating systems require OEMs to include
a particular browser; (2) whether Microsoft's own actions reflect a percep-
tion of a competitive market for 'Internet Explorer' separate from the market
for Windows 95; and even (3) the very existence of competitor browser
manufacturers.""2 3 Consistent with the available evidence on these points,
Judge Wald seemed inclined to believe that the typical consumer regards
Internet Explorer "as a particular vehicle for accessing information on the
Internet, regardless of the underlying code associated with that process. 20"
As to the existence of synergies, Judge Wald seems highly skeptical. For
example, she indicated that the fact Internet Explorer "distributes certain
code to the operating system may simply suggest that some or all of this
code should not be considered part of 'Internet Explorer' at all but part of
the operating system. '25 To the extent that there are no synergies, only the
first factor would apply and the result produced by Judge Wald's balancing
test would produce the same result as antitrust law. Judge Wald did, how-
ever, acknowledge that the record contained some evidence of synergies. 6
Since synergies can outweigh even the clearest evidence of consumer de-
mand under Judge Wald's test, one cannot know whether her test will find
one product where antitrust law finds two until the balance is struck.
The Court of Appeals objected to Judge Wald's balancing test not be-
cause of its inconsistency with antitrust law, but because they felt that syn-
ergies and consumer perceptions were incommensurable and because courts
"are ill equipped to evaluate the benefits of high-tech product design.' '2° The
latter objection is predictable given the rest of the Court of Appeals' opin-
ion. Again, this concern is unfounded given the ability of courts to deal with
complex technological issues in other contexts, and the success that other
courts have had in applying antitrust law to high-tech industries. The former
objection sweeps too broadly since it could be made to every judicial bal-
ancing test.
The real problem with Judge Wald's test is that it adds an unnecessary
203. 1d& at 962 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 964 (citations omitted).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 964 (Wald, J., dissenting).
207. Microsoft, 147 F. at 952.
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degree of complexity that may produce the wrong result in some cases. As
previously noted, the efficiency effects of synergy are already accounted for
in the consumer demand test, i.e., if there are overwhelming efficiencies to
joint provision, consumers will stop demanding separate provision and the
consumer perception of the two items will change from two distinct prod-
ucts to a single integrated product. If the synergies are insignificant, then
consumer demand will not change. Balancing the manufacturers' evidence
of synergies against consumer demand creates the risk that what a manu-
facturer wants can overrule the realities of consumer demand. This is par-
ticularly true in a case like Microsoft's where high barriers to entry effec-
tively prevent consumers from turning to other manufacturers for alternative
product combinations.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR WINDOWS 98 TYING CLAIMS LITIGATION
On May 18, 1998, the DOJ filed a new lawsuit under the Sherman Act
seeking an injunction to prevent Microsoft from, inter alia, tying Internet
Explorer to the Windows 98 OS."' The Court of Appeals acknowledged this
lawsuit, stating that in light of its holding regarding the consent decree, the
DOJ "may well regard further pursuit of the [tying] case as unpromising.""' 9
The Court of Appeals' point would be well taken if the Court of Appeals
had interpreted the consent decree in a manner consistent with antitrust law.
Since the Court of Appeals interpreted the consent decree in a manner
wholly inconsistent with antitrust law, its decision should have no bearing
on Windows 98 litigation.
Nonetheless, Microsoft has moved for summary judgment of the Win-
dows 98 antitrust litigation based in large part on the Court of Appeals' con-
sent decree decision."' Microsoft also incorporated some of the Court of
208. See Complaint at 50-51, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
209. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 953. The Court of Appeals' statement is vague about pre-
cisely which "case" the DOJ might want to re-consider. The Court of Appeals may have
been referring to the consent decree case in particular, as opposed to the tying claims
against Microsoft in general. Nonetheless, it would appear that the Court of Appeals meant
the tying claims in general since the Court of Appeals contrasted the "unpromising case"
with the "alternate avenues" in the Windows 98 litigation. Id.
210. See Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion
for Summary Judgment at 22, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.)
("[Tihe Court of Appeals expressly stated that its analysis was 'consistent with tying law'.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' analysis is fully applicable to this case."). See also Ra-
jiv Chandrasekaran, Microsoft to Move for Dismissal, WAsH. PoST, Aug. 7, 1998, at FO.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Microsoft actually goes beyond the Court
of Appeals and argues that "technologically interconnected products are immune from ty-
ing claims as long as the physical interconnection of the two products achieves some tech-
nologically beneficial result." Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(D.D.C.). In support of its assertion, Microsoft relies on a bevy of lower court decisions,
most of which were decided before Jefferson Parish and which may no longer be valid. For
example, Microsoft places a great deal of weight on pre-Jefferson Parish decisions from
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Appeals' language into its Answer, asserting, for example, that "the incorpo-
ration of Internet Explorer technologies into Windows is efficient and pro-
duces benefits that users could not otherwise obtain themselves. 21' None-
theless, Microsoft's pleadings specifically deny that "there is a separate
demand for operating systems that lack web browsing functionality, ' 'iW a po-
sition framed in terms consistent with antitrust law.
The Court of Appeals' decision also appears to have influenced the
DOJ. For instance, the failure to identify exactly which parts of the software
code constituted the Internet Explorer presented the DOJ with one of its
most significant problems in enforcing the consent decree. Microsoft seized
on this ambiguity first to ship an inoperable version of Windows 95213 and
then to obtain a stipulation that Microsoft could comply with the District
Court's order to remove Internet Explorer by hiding the code, but otherwise
still leaving it in place on the PC.214 The Court of Appeals placed a great
deal of weight on this in holding that Internet Explorer and the OS had no
separate existence."5 The DOJ has apparently learned from this mistake and
has obtained a court order compelling Microsoft to produce evidence which
may allow the DOJ to specify which parts of the software code make up the
the Ninth Circuit, including, Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 703 F.2d 534
(9th Cir. 1983), Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), and California
Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979). Subsequent to these decisions,
however, the Ninth Circuit upheld the application of tying law as outlined by Jefferson
Parish to technologically interconnected products in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
Microsoft relies on two obscure post-Jefferson Parish lower court cases, Condesa Del Mar,
Inc. v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co., No. 86 C 9116, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8618
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1987), and Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
585 F. Supp. 1470 (D.N.J. 1984). Condesa Del Mar does support Microsoft's position, but
the fact that it is an unpublished district court opinion that fails to cite Jefferson Parish or
any U.S. Supreme Court tying cases in support of its tying analysis strongly suggests that
Condesa Del Mar should not have any bearing the Windows 98 litigation. Innovation Data
Processing, although a published decision, is so obscure that Microsoft's brief repeatedly
misstates the case name as International Data Processing. Although Microsoft says that
Innovation Data Processing is "squarely on point," the defendant in Innovation Data Proc-
essing sold the products in both bundled and unbundled form. 585 F. Supp. at 1474. As In-
novation Data Processing pointed out, "on that basics [sic] alone there is no illegal tying."
Id. at 1475. Consequently, the comments in Innovation Data Processing about "a lawful
package of technologically interrelated components" constitutes mere dicta. Id. at 1476.
Finally, it is dubious to refer to Innovation Data Processing as a post-Jefferson Parish case
since it was decided a scant three days after Jefferson Parish and contains no reference to
the U.S. Supreme Court decision.
211. Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Answer to the Complaint Filed by the U.S.
Department of Justice 119, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
212. Id. 9 104.
213. See WENDY RoHM GOLDMAN, THEMICROSOFr FILE 277 (1998).
214. See 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13242, at 10-11.
215. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 952 n.18 (Having an OEM "hide the allegedly tied
product suggests the oddity of treating as separate products the functionalities that are inte-
grated in the way that Windows 95 and [Internet Explorer] are.").
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web browser." 6
The outcome of any lawsuit turns upon the court's evaluation of the
conflicting evidence, as well as the legal tests applied to those findings of
fact; the same will be true in the DOJ's current lawsuit against Microsoft." 7
Nevertheless, it is possible to see how the decision to use the Court of Ap-
peals' test versus antitrust law's consumer demand test may affect the out-
come of the DOJ's tying claims. Application of the Court of Appeals' test
will make it virtually impossible for the DOJ to prove that Windows 98 and
Internet Explorer are separate products. Microsoft alleges that the OS and
Internet Explorer have a greater degree of unity than Windows 95 and Inter-
net Explorer,"' which should satisfy the first prong of the Court of Appeals'
test. Although the Microsoft pleadings do not identify the specific benefits
achieved from bundling Windows 98 and Internet Explorer, Microsoft iden-
tified two benefits from bundling the web browser and the OS.'29 First, Mi-
crosoft represents that Windows 98 creates a new user interface by allowing
users to access applications and documents on their hard drive through the
web browser.2 Second, the "Help" feature of Windows 98 is written in html
code, and therefore requires use of a web browser. 2' Any evidence that the
DOJ might offer to contradict the veracity of Microsoft's proffered claims is
irrelevant under the Court of Appeals' analysis, since the issue is not
whether Microsoft's claims are true but whether they are plausible.
Judge Wald's balancing test could prove attractive insofar as it provides
216. See Joel Brinkley, U.S. Judge Orders Microsoft to Turn Over Operating System
Code, N.Y. TiMES (Aug. 7, 1998) <http:llwwv.nytimes.comllibrary/tech/98/08/biztech/
articles/07microsoft.html>.
217. This is reflected in Judge Jackson's deep ambivalence over which test to apply in
response to Microsoft's motion for summary judgment. United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1431, *33 (D.D.C. 1998). Ultimately, he decided that there was
conflicting evidence as to whether the Windows/IE combination produced a synergy, id at
*39, thereby reserving judgment for trial.
218. See Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Answer to the Complaint Filed by the
U.S. Department of Justice 116, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.)
("[B]ecause Internet Explorer technologies pervade numerous aspects of Windows 98, the
ready means of accessing the web browsing functionality provided by these technologies
cannot be 'hidden' from end users in Windows 98 as they could be in certain version of
Windows 95 by using an Add/Remove Programs utility.").
219. Microsoft's brief identifies a total of five benefits from Windows 95, but at least
two-the Internet Connection Wizard and technologies "not directly Internet-related," De-
fendant Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7-8, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.)---clearly are not
benefits from bundling the web browser software with the OS. A third, the exposure of "a
large number of application programming interfaces ('APIs') that ISVs use to obtain oper-
ating system services," id. at 8, is more problematic since some or all of these APIs may
come from the web browser source code. The Internet Explorer web browser undoubtedly
contains APIs. Yet it would be misleading to say that these APIs result from bundling,
since other web browsers, including Netscape, also include APIs.
220. See Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion
for Summary Judgment at 7-8, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
221. See id. at 6-7.
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something of a middle ground between antitrust law and the Court of Ap-
peals' unquestioning deference to Microsoft. Since Judge Wald would
weigh the strength of the evidence of consumer demand for separate prod-
ucts against the synergies actually achieved from bundling, the DOJ would
have an opportunity to challenge the veracity of Microsoft's claimed syner-
gies from bundling. The first, that Internet Explorer creates a new user inter-
face, is highly dubious given the fact that users were able to achieve this
with Windows 95 by installing Internet Explorer as a separate application if
they wanted the new interface." As to the second synergy, "Help" files
written in html, any web browser can read html files. Web pages, after all,
are written in html code. So this is hardly a synergy from bundling.
As discussed infra, the DOJ appears to have a very strong case to sup-
port consumer demand for separate provision of the web browser and the
OS. In addition to the weak evidence of synergy offered by Microsoft in
support of its motion for summary judgment, the available extrinsic evi-
dence suggests that consumers do not place much value on the "improved"
interface allegedly created by bundling.2" Indeed, one can turn off the new
interface," 4 which suggests that a significant number of consumers do not
want it. Microsoft will have shipped an enormous number of copies of Win-
dows 98 by the time of trial, not because consumers necessarily perceive any
synergy from bundling the web browser with the OS, but because Microsoft
no longer offers consumers the option of purchasing the OS without the web
browser.2"
Assuming that antitrust law's consumer demand is applied, it appears
likely that the DOJ will prevail on the single product issue. As previously
noted, Microsoft claims that all OSs incorporate web browsers, 6 and Mi-
222. See Windows 98: Interface, FAMILY PC (June 1998) <http://wwwl.zdnet.com/
familypc/content/9805/win98/interface.html> ("Windows 98 is basically Windows 95 with
Internet Explorer 4.0."). See also Ed Bott, Windows 98: Worth the Wait?, PC COMPurING
(July 1998) <http://www.zdnet.com/products/content/pccg/1107/20070.htm> ('"f you've
already upgraded Windows with Internet Explorer 4.0, you won't find any surprises in the
Windows 98 user interface.").
223. See Jim O'Brien, Value Is Relative for Windows 98 Upgrade, COMPUTER SHOPPER
(June 25, 1998) <http://www.zdnet.comlnetbuyer/editlsmartshopperlbuy-perspective/
062598bp.html> ("Nobody should feel compelled to upgrade to Windows 98."). See also
Stephanie Miles, Win 98: Minor Upgrade, Forced March, CNET NEWS.COM (June 25,
1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,23534,00.html> ("Few corporations will find
Windows 98 features compelling enough to go to the time and expense of upgrading right
away.").
224. See 20 Questions on Win98, FAMILY PC (June 1998) <http://wwwl.zdnet.com/
familypc/contentl98051win98/20quesl-4.html> ("You can set Windows 98 to what it calls
'classic style' so you can work the desktop and view folders in familiar Windows 95 fash-
ion.").
225. As of June 25, 1998, "computer vendors are going to stop loading Windows 95 on
consumer machines and only offer Windows 98." Miles, supra note 223.
226. See James Niccolai, Microsoft's Antitrust Defense Revealed in Subpoena to
Novell, INFoWoRLD ELECrRIC (July 24, 1998) <http://www.infoworld.com/cgibin/display
Story.pl?980724.ehmsoftnovell.htm> ("Microsoft will try to show the court that every
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crosoft has attempted to obtain evidence from a number of OS vendors to
support this contention." Evidence that other vendors require installation of
their web browser with their OS software would indicate that the browser is
part of the OS, but whether this evidence exists is questionable. For exam-
ple, when Apple Computer, Inc., one of the vendors subpoenaed by Micro-
soft, released the current version of its Macintosh OS (OS 8), Apple in-
cluded three different browsers on the installation CD-ROM?*2 Apple wrote
only one of the three web browsers, an application called Cyberdog. A user
who chose the default settings would install either Netscape or Internet Ex-
plorer,2 not Apple's Cyberdog. Furthermore, Apple gives its users the op-
tion of not installing any web browser. In short, Apple's OS 8 seems to sup-
port the DOJ's case that the web browser is a separate product that can be
provided by different vendors or simply dispensed with.
Because the DOJ requested a preliminary injunction, it filed a consider-
able amount of evidence with its complaintY How well this evidence will
hold up under the scrutiny of trial only time will tell, but the DOJ appears to
have put together an unusually strong case that consumers view the OS and
the web browser as separate products. The DOJ has produced testimony and
documentary evidence from within Microsoft showing that Microsoft itself
treats Internet Explorer as a separate product. For example, evidence ob-
tained by the DOJ from within Microsoft shows, among other things, that
Microsoft (1) advertises and promotes Internet Explorer as a separate prod-
uct to Windows OS customers, (2) separately tracks web browser market
share from OS market share, and (3) plans to release Internet Explorer spe-
cific software updates so that consumers may use the latest version of Inter-
net Explorer without also switching to the latest version of the Windows
OSY Furthermore, despite advice from its legal counsel not to refer to
other developer of operating system software has incorporated support for Internet stan-
dards including Web functionality into their products."). See also Defendant Microsoft
Corporation's Answer to the Complaint Filed by the U.S. Department of Justice 104,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
227. See Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Compel
Novell, Inc. to Comply with the Subpoena Dated June 10, 1998, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1232(C.D. Utah) <http://www. microsoft.com/presspass/doj/7-
23novell.htm>.
228. Ironically, an injunction requiring Microsoft to include browsers from alternate
vendors is one of the forms of relief sought by the DOJ. Complaint at 51, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
229. When Apple first released OS 8, Netscape was the default web browser. In ex-
change for Microsoft's agreement to purchase $150 million of Apple stock, the default web
browser for OS 8 was changed to Internet Explorer.
230. As one would expect, given that Microsoft has filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, Microsoft has not really challenged the DOJ's evidence, except to say that it is le-
gally insufficient based on the Court of Appeals' opinion. See Defendant Microsoft Corpo-
ration's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 39-41, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
231. See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction at 48-50, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
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Internet Explorer as a separate product, 2 Microsoft never referred to Inter-
net Explorer as anything but a separate product until the DOJ formally
challenged Microsoft's bundling practices under the consent decree. 3 In ad-
dition to the DOJ's evidence, Microsoft admitted in its pleadings that "there
are limited sources of separate demand for standalone web browsing soft-
ware."
234
Although Microsoft all but concedes the lack of demand for web
browsers apart from the OS, its pleadings deny the existence of "separate
demand for operating systems that lack web browser functionality." The
DOJ, however, has amassed considerable evidence from OEMs of signifi-
cant consumer demand for the OS without the web browser functionality.2
6
Business consumers, in particular, sometimes prefer not have web browsers
installed in order "to prevent [their] employees from accessing or attempting
to access the Internet or World Wide Web."' 7 One of Microsoft's execu-
tives, for example, has already testified in the consent decree proceedings
that Microsoft disseminated instructions on how to remove Internet Explorer
from Windows 95 in response to demand from corporate customers who
wanted Windows without the Internet Explorer web browser."
Although it would go a long way toward establishing the existence of
distinct products, the DOJ does not need to prove that consumers want the
OS without any web browser. Hospital patients clearly do not demand sur-
gery without anesthesia, yet Jefferson Parish still found that surgery and an-
esthesia were separate products because patients desired to purchase these
services from separate vendors? 9 Kodak suggests the existence of competi-
tors, such as Netscape, in the web browser market tends to establish product
separateness.24 So too does the DOJ's evidence from OEMs that some con-
sumers want a web browser other than Internet Explorer installed with the
Windows OS. 4' For example, at least one OEM has tried to configure its
232. See id. at 8 n.3.
233. See id. at 8 n.3, 49.
234. Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Answer to the Complaint Filed by the U.S.
Department of Justice, United States v. Microsoft Corp. 104, No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
235. Id.
236. See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction at 52-55, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
237. Id. at 52 (quoting Declaration of Joseph J. Kanicki, 4/29/98, 2).
238. See id. at 51.
239. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1984).
240. In its pleadings, Microsoft states that "other companies have entered and will
continue to enter the business of supplying software providing web browsing functional-
ity," Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Answer to the Complaint Filed by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, United States v. Microsoft Corp. 1 11, No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.), thereby
providing further support for the DOJ's argument that the browser and the OS are separate
products.
241. See Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction at 52, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.) ("Some business
and government customers prefer not to have Internet Explorer preinstalled on their corn-
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PCs so that end users can choose a browser, "a process that would include
having Internet Explorer automatically removed if the user selected Net-
scape.
'242
Perhaps the strongest evidence that consumers distinguish between the
OS and the web browser comes from outside the evidence in the DOJ's
pleadings. Shortly after the DOJ filed its lawsuit, at least one OEM stopped
installing Internet Explorer243 and another began to install both Internet Ex-
plorer and Netscape so that "users will be able to choose which browser they
want."
2
"
It is always hazardous to predict a court's findings of fact before the
trial has even begun, but given the evidence cited by the DOJ in its plead-
ings, one would be remiss in not concluding that application of antitrust law
will lead to a finding that Microsoft's OS and its web browser are distinct
products. At the same time, it is almost a forgone conclusion that applica-
tion of the Court of Appeals' test would lead to an inconsistent result.
V. CONCLUSION
Since neither the Court of Appeals nor Judge Wald in dissent inter-
preted section IV(E)(i) in a manner consistent with antitrust law, one might
ask whether the language of the consent decree precludes application of an-
titrust law's consumer demand test? The answer is no. Given the fairly
vague language used in the consent decree and the almost total lack of "evi-
dence of any kind in the record as to what the parties to the consent decree
intended,12 45 any number of interpretations are plausible. So while the Court
of Appeals' interpretation and Judge Wald's interpretation certainly fall
within the range of reasonable meanings, an interpretation consistent with
antitrust law is also possible. For example, section IV(E)(i) could mean that
Microsoft may create OSs which include features of other products, so long
as Microsoft also gives OEMs the option of installing the OS without the
added features. In other words, Microsoft did not violate the consent decree
by adding Internet Explorer to Windows 95, but Microsoft did violate the
puters because: (1) the customer may have its own software; (2) the customer may wish to
install a competitive browser instead of Internet Explorer.") (quoting Declaration of Joseph
J. Kanicki, 4/29/98, 2). See also id. at 53-54 ("Our corporate customers do not like to
have choices forced upon them, but would rather choose themselves which [web browser]
they use.") (quoting Jon Kies Dep. p. 11, lines 13-22); id. at 54-55 (citing evidence that
Microsoft had refused to allow at least one major OEM's request for permission to ship
Windows 98 without Internet Explorer because its customers "prefer a different browser").
242. Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 23 n.15, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.).
243. See Dan Briody, NEC to Stop Pre-loading Browsers with Systems, INFOWORLD
ELECrRic, (May 22, 1998) <http://www.infoworld.com/cgifibin/displayStory.pl?980522.
wcnec.htm>.
244. Id.
245. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 961 n.8.
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consent decree when it refused to offer Windows 95 without Internet Ex-
plorer. 46 Antitrust law does not prohibit a manufacturer from bundling two
distinct products provided consumers are given the alternative of purchasing
them separately.247 If, of course, the synergies from "integrating" Internet
Explorer into the OS are real and significant, then consumer demand for web
browser software separate from the OS will cease and the two will become
one product. But the merger of two products into one will occur because of
genuine benefits actually valued by consumers, rather than Microsoft's pref-
erence to offer the browser and OS as a single package. 8
This leads to the final and perhaps most important issue: should anti-
trust law adopt either of the tests put forward by the Court of Appeals and
Judge Wald as the test for separate products? Here again the answer must be
no. It bears repetition that tying arrangements threaten competition because
tying denies competitors "free access to the market for the tied product" and
denies consumers "free choice among competing products."249 Both the
Court of Appeals and Judge Wald ignore these goals to the extent that they
allow Microsoft, rather than market forces, to define what constitutes a sin-
gle product." ° Current antitrust doctrine, however, is consistent with the
246. This is essentially the interpretation made by the District Court and the DOJ.
247. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1958) ("Of course
where the buyer is free to take either product by itself there is no tying problem even
though the seller may also offer the two items as a unit at a single price.").
248. Professor Dratler offers essentially this same justification for condemning Micro-
soft's bundling of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer under section 1 of the Sherman Act:
[Tihe marketplace itself determines the business consequences of the legal de-
cision [that the OS and web browser are distinct products]. If the court is wrong
and the products at issue do not really enjoy separate consumer demand, con-
sumers may continue to buy them together, and no harm to competition will re-
sult. But if the court is right, and there really is separate demand for the prod-
ucts, whole new vistas of competition, previously foreclosed by the tie, will be
opened. Thus, a holding that a tie is illegal does no harm. [lit is therefore a no-
lose proposition.
Dratler, supra note 134, at 729 (footnotes omitted). Compare AREEDA ET AL., supra note 20,
at 206 ("[O]ffering items separately furthers no anticompetitive goal."). Not only is the risk
of harm from an erroneous finding of tying low, the OS market has a number of unusual
characteristics that make it unusually likely that Microsoft would use tying to restrain com-
petition. See Baseman et al., supra note 6, at 295-98.
249. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6. Accord Karen L. Hunt, Comment, Product
Separability: A Workable Standard to Identify Tie-In Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 160, 164 n.22 (1972) ("[T]he Court seeks to protect two interests
in tie-in cases: (1) to protect buyers from coerced purchases; (2) [t]o protect competitors'
(of tied products) access to the consuming market."); Festa, supra note 73, at 643-44.
250. There is no end in sight to what Microsoft may want to require consumers to ac-
cept under the guise of product innovation and integration. For example, Judge Wald
warned that under the Court of Appeals' test Microsoft could condition the purchase of the
OS on the purchase of "word-processing programs, spreadsheets, and virtually any other
now-separate software product by identifying some minimal synergy associated with such
'integration."' Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 962 n.9. It now appears that Microsoft intends to do
precisely that by "integrating" its Office suite of business software (which includes word
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goals of antitrust law and leaves the determination of the single product is-
sue where it belongs, in the hands of consumers." I
This does not mean that every time Microsoft or any other manufacturer
decides to combine two products a per se violation of antitrust law will oc-
cur. As the Supreme Court stated in Jefferson Parish, the fact that consum-
ers "are required to purchase two separate items is only the beginning of the
appropriate inquiry."' Indeed, Jefferson Parish exemplifies the fact that not
all packaged sales of distinct products constitute illegal tying. Although the
hospital had packaged two distinct products, the Court refused to hold that
the package was illegal per se because the hospital lacked the requisite mar-
ket power in the tying product. 3 Ultimately, the question of illegal tying
depends on whether the manufacturer has sufficient market power in the ty-
ing product to force consumers to purchase the tied product.' Without this
power, one cannot presume that the packaged sales are anticompetitive.
The Court of Appeals unquestionably handed Microsoft a significant
public relations and psychological victory in its ongoing dispute with the
DOJ. Whatever the merits of either the majority or the dissent as interpreta-
tions of the consent decree, neither opinion has, or should have, anything to
do with the ultimate question of whether Microsoft, or anyone else for that
matter, has violated the antitrust law prohibition on tying. Microsoft would
like to portray its dispute with the DOJ as a battle over whether the govern-
ment will dictate the terms of product innovation; but from an antitrust law
perspective, it is a battle over whether Microsoft or consumers will control
the future of information technology.
processing and spreadsheet applications) with the next version of Internet Explorer. See
Paula Rooney, Microsoft Marries IE 5.0, Office 2000 Interface, COMPUTER RErAIL WEEK,
(Aug. 10, 1998) <http://207.240.177.145/news/l1998/weekending0798/aug07digO8.asp>.
Since Microsoft claims that Internet Explorer is an integrated part of the OS, this means
that Microsoft will undoubtedly claim that the Office package is also an integral part of the
OS.
251. See Strasser, supra note 64, at 257 ("[The consumer demand test] is consistent
with tying law's goal of avoiding foreclosure and entry barriers. Defining product markets
by buyer demand will direct attention to whether any competitive harms are occurring.").
252. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25 (1984).
253. See id. at 26-29.
254. See id. at 28 ('Tying arrangements need only be condemned if they restrain com-
petition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not otherwise be made.").
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